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REEXAMINING SOCIAL WORKER IMMUNITY IN THE CHILD
WELFARE CONTEXT
Sarah Schneider*
I. INTRODUCTION
In the midst of the Black Lives Matter movement, many have called
for police reform, citing the law enforcement system’s inherent racism
and frequent brutality.1 The doctrine of qualified immunity for police
officers has received special attention,2 as it prevents victims of police
brutality from recovering against perpetrators in court.3 Other
government officials are also entitled to immunity,4 including child
protective services (“CPS”) social workers.
The child welfare system, or “family regulation system,” as Dorothy
Roberts refers to it, has been compared to the law enforcement system.5
Like law enforcement, CPS disproportionately targets and burdens
people of color and low-income families.6 It also can cause immediate
and long-term harm to the children and families it serves.7 But can the
social workers who work on behalf of CPS be compared to police
officers?
* J.D. Candidate, 2022, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., Rutgers University. I
would like to thank Professor Solangel Maldonado for her invaluable guidance, as well
as the members of the Seton Hall Law Review for their careful editing.
1 See Evan Semones, ‘Enough is Enough’: Thousands Descend on D.C. for Largest
George Floyd Protest Yet, POLITICO (June 6, 2020, 5:06 PM), https://www.politico.com/
news/2020/06/06/george-floyd-blm-protest-washington-304635; Farah Stockman &
John Eligon, Cities Ask if It’s Time to Defund Police and ‘Reimagine’ Public Safety, N.Y. TIMES
(June 8, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/05/us/defund-police-floyd-protests.html.
2 See, e.g., WHITNEY K. NOVAK, CONG. RSCH. SERV., LSB10492, POLICING THE POLICE:
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY AND CONSIDERATIONS FOR CONGRESS (2020); Hailey Fuchs, Qualified
Immunity Protection for Police Emerges as Flash Point Amid Protests, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 18,
2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/23/us/politics/qualified-immunity.html.
3 See infra Section III.A for more on qualified immunity.
4 See NOVAK, supra note 2, at 2.
5 See Dorothy Roberts, Abolishing Policing Also Means Abolishing Family Regulation,
IMPRINT (June 16, 2020, 5:26 AM), https://imprintnews.org/child-welfare-2/abolishingpolicing-also-means-abolishing-family-regulation/44480.
6 See infra Part II.
7 See Marsha Garrison & Cynthia Godsoe, Reforming Child Protection Law: A Public
Health Approach, 21 J.L. & POL’Y 1, 1 (2012).
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CPS caseworkers, like police, are forced to make difficult, quick
decisions.8 Like police, they respond to calls—some of which are
intentionally false, some of which are misguided.9 Like police, most
social workers are white,10 presenting a problem because children of
color are disproportionately represented in the child welfare system.11
Social workers and police may be no more biased than the rest of the
U.S. population, but their implicit and explicit biases have a detrimental
effect on the people they are supposed to serve.12 Lastly, as mentioned,
CPS social workers also may be entitled to qualified immunity as
government officials when they violate someone’s constitutional
rights.13
Yet CPS social workers face unique challenges. As discussed later
in this Comment,14 social workers are overworked, underpaid, and
subject to the stress of working for a bureaucratic system. In addition,
the system gives them overwhelmingly broad discretion over serious
decisions affecting families, and they are prone to compassion fatigue
and burnout.15 Given the similarities and differences between the CPS
and law enforcement systems and between police and social workers,
this Comment examines social worker qualified and absolute
immunity.16
8 See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989) (“[P]olice officers are often forced
to make split-second judgments . . . .”).
9 See CHILD.’S BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., CHILD MALTREATMENT 2019,
at 16 (2019) [hereinafter CHILD MALTREATMENT], https://www.acf.hhs.gov/cb/
report/child-maltreatment-2019; see also infra Part 0 for a discussion of misguided
reports influenced by bias and assumptions.
10 See Stephanie Smith Ledesma, The Vanishing of the African American Family:
“Reasonable Efforts” and Its Connection to the Disproportionality of the Child Welfare
System, 9 CHARLESTON L. REV. 29, 51 (2014) (“[M]any of ‘the professionals in the [CPS]
system are by and large well-educated, middle class, and predominately white.’”);
SHELLEY HYLAND & ELIZABETH DAVIS, U.S. DEP’T JUST., LOCAL POLICE DEPARTMENTS, 2016:
PERSONNEL 6 (2019) (reporting that 71.5 percent of full-time local police officers are
white); see also Child, Family, and School Social Workers, DATA USA,
https://datausa.io/profile/soc/child-family-and-school-social-workers (reporting that
57.9 percent of child, family, and school social workers are white (non-Hispanic)) (last
visited Jan. 17, 2021).
11 See infra Part II.
12 See Vivek Sankaran, With Child Welfare, Racism is Hiding in the Discretion, IMPRINT
(June 21, 2020, 11:00 PM), https://imprintnews.org/child-welfare-2/with-child-welfare-racism-is-hiding-in-the-discretion/44616; see also Rebecca Jean Featherston et al.,
Interventions to Mitigate Bias in Social Work Decision-Making: A Systematic Review, RSCH.
SOC. WORK PRAC. 741, 742 (2019).
13 See Rudolph Alexander, Social Workers and Immunity from Civil Lawsuits, 40 SOC.
WORK 648 (1995). For an overview of immunity, see infra Section III.A.
14 See infra Section III.C.
15 See infra Section III.C.
16 See infra Section III.A for a discussion and explanation of immunity.
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The child welfare system is a group of services, largely the
responsibility of the states, designed to help keep children safe from
harm in the home.17 When the state, through CPS, investigates a family
under suspicion of abuse or neglect, it must respect the family’s
constitutional rights.18 Specifically, it must ensure that it does not
infringe on a parent’s Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest in the
care and custody of a child or the Fourth Amendment protection from
illegal searches and seizures.19 A social worker who investigates a
family without a warrant may violate the child’s Fourth Amendment
right against illegal searches and seizures.20 A social worker who
removes a child without justification violates the parent’s Fourteenth
Amendment right to familial association.21 Although federal law—
through § 198322—allows individuals to sue state actors for violations
of their constitutional rights, courts have granted social workers
qualified immunity when the constitutional right is not “clearly
established.”23
When social workers perform acts “intimately
associated with the judicial . . . process,”24 such as initiating court
proceedings, a court may also grant them absolute or quasi-judicial
immunity.25
The idea that CPS and its workers can and do commit acts against
families that violate the Constitution runs counter to the intended

17 See CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., HOW THE CHILD
WELFARE SYSTEM WORKS 1–2 (Feb. 2013) [hereinafter HOW THE CHILD WELFARE SYSTEM
WORKS], https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs/cpswork.pdf.
18 See Teri Dobbins Baxter, Constitutional Limits on the Right of Government
Investigators to Interview and Examine Alleged Victims of Child Abuse or Neglect, 21 WM.
& MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 125, 125–27 (2012).
19 See U.S. CONST. amends. IV, XIV.
20 See, e.g., Good v. Dauphin Cnty. Soc. Servs. for Children & Youth, 891 F.2d 1087,
1089 (3d Cir. 1989); Calabretta v. Floyd, 189 F.3d 808, 810 (9th Cir. 1999).
21 See, e.g., Schulkers v. Kammer, 955 F.3d 520, 539–40 (6th Cir. 2020); see also
Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (explaining that “the interest of parents in the
care, custody, and control of their children” is a fundamental liberty protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment).
22 In relevant part, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 states:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, . . . subjects . . . any citizen . . . to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, [or] suit in equity
....
42 U.S.C. § 1983.
23 See Section III.A for a discussion of qualified immunity and the definition of
“clearly established.”
24 Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976).
25 See, e.g., Turner v. Lowen, No. 19-6235, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 23446, at *9 (6th Cir.
July 24, 2020); see also infra Section III.A.
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purpose of CPS; the system is intended to protect children and help
families.26 Many people in this country who do not live in fear of CPS
knocking on their door may believe that it is accomplishing that goal.
The “master narrative,” after all, is that children need saving from “bad
parents.”27 Many Americans believe that if CPS has investigated a family,
the parent or parents must be either lazy, drug-addicted, or
monstrous.28 But this is not the perception of the system for many of its
greatly surveilled low-income families and families of color, who
distrust it.29 To them, the disproportionality is no mystery.30
Of course, there is undoubtedly an interest in protecting children
from the kind of severe abuse that we see in the news.31 Those cases are
horrific. Yet, at the same time, physical abuse cases constitute only 10.3
percent of maltreatment cases.32 Most cases—61 percent—are neglect
cases that can be traced to poverty.33 What we do not often see on the
news are the families who suffer as a result of unwarranted state
intervention. This Comment focuses on how the CPS system can
affirmatively harm the families it is meant to help. Part II will provide
background on some of those harms, including those resulting from

See HOW THE CHILD WELFARE SYSTEM WORKS, supra note 17, at 1.
Ledesma, supra note 10, at 33 (citing Matthew I. Fraidin, Stories Told and Untold:
Confidentiality Laws and the Master Narrative of Child Welfare, 63 ME. L. REV. 1, 2 (2010);
Cynthia Godsoe, Parsing Parenthood, 17 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 113, 121 (2013)).
28 See id. at 31.
29 Tanya Asim Cooper, Racial Bias in the American Foster Care System: The National
Debate, 97 MARQ. L. REV. 215, 238 (2013).
30 “For [Black and Native Americans at risk for removal] there is no riddle of
overrepresentation of these children in foster care; African Americans ‘get the short end
of the stick on every indicia of social well-being: life span, morbidity, incarceration,
education, victimization by crime, income, wealth, you name it!’” Id. at 239 (footnotes
omitted) (citing Child Advocacy Program, Race & Child Welfare: Disproportionality,
Disparity, Discrimination: Re-Assessing the Facts, Re-Thinking the Policy Options, HARV.
L. SCH., (Jan. 28–29, 2011), https://cap.law.harvard.edu/events-and-conferences/capconferences/race-and-child-welfare/conference-videos/).
31 See, e.g., Anemona Hartocollis, Couple Who Tortured 12 Children in Their California
Home Are Sentenced to Life, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 19, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/
2019/04/19/us/turpin-family.html (describing the charges brought against parents of
the twelve Turpin children); Garret Therolf, How Officials Failed to Save Gabriel
Fernandez From Years of Abuse, Torture, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 8, 2016), https://
www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-gabriel-fernandez-torture-case-20160407story.html; THE TRIALS OF GABRIEL FERNANDEZ (Netflix documentary 2020) (describing the
murder of Gabriel Fernandez by his mother and her boyfriend); Greg Blass, Opinion,
Abuse, Cruelty, and a System That Failed a Child It Was Supposed to Protect, RIVERHEAD
LOC. (Feb. 9, 2020, 7:05 AM), https://riverheadlocal.com/2020/02/09/thomas-valvadeath-questions-about-failed-syste/.
32 CHILD MALTREATMENT, supra note 9, at 49.
33 Id. See infra Section II.B for a brief discussion on the connection between poverty
and neglect.
26
27
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removal from the home, safety plans, and investigations. Part IV
discusses cases that highlight these harms. As we will see, both absolute
and qualified immunities of social workers also play a role in these
cases.
This Comment will examine social worker immunity and its
rationales, how and under what circumstances courts have granted it,
and how it may hinder progress in the system.34 Given the difficult job
CPS social workers have and the complexities of the system, this
Comment ultimately argues that reform or elimination of qualified and
absolute immunity is necessary but must be accompanied by significant
changes to the system. Part II of this Comment will discuss in more
detail the impact the child welfare system has on families—particularly
those of color and those living in poverty. Part III will discuss the origins
of both qualified and absolute immunity and the rationale for social
worker immunity. Part IV will introduce and analyze recent cases
involving social worker immunity to discuss the current state of the law,
offer a look into social workers’ jobs, and reveal flaws in the child
welfare system. Finally, Part V will discuss pathways to limiting
immunity for social workers as well as reforming the child welfare
system by diversifying its workforce, affording less discretion to social
workers, and narrowing its scope to well-grounded reports of physical
or sexual abuse.
II. THE CPS SYSTEM’S DISPARATE IMPACT ON FAMILIES
This Part provides an overview of the effects that the child welfare
system has on families in America. First, it will provide an overview of
removal from the home, safety plans, investigations, and their
associated harms. Then, through statistics and some history, it serves
to emphasize the broad and wide-reaching impact the child welfare
system has on families while also addressing the reality many individual
families face.

34 A variety of sources written by real parents and families affected by the CPS
system will appear throughout this Comment. What I hope to accomplish by including
these stories is to provide a look at the real lives beyond a court’s recitation of events.
So often in this system, social workers, courts, and society choose not to believe the
stories of children and, especially, of their parents. See Michael Fitzgerald, Rising Voices
for ‘Family Power’ Seek to Abolish the Child Welfare System, IMPRINT (July 8, 2020, 11:45
PM), https://imprintnews.org/child-welfare-2/family-power-seeks-abolish-cps-childwelfare/45141 (“‘Family just aren’t believed,’ said Kristie Puckett-Williams, a campaign
manager for North Carolina’s American Civil Liberties Union and a formerly
incarcerated mother who has faced CPS investigations.”).
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Removal of children from their families is perhaps the most
obvious harm associated with CPS.35 The children that CPS separates
from their families experience psychological trauma, for instance, in the
form of separation and attachment disorders.36 Research suggests that
early childhood disruption of the bonding process can result in
emotional distress at the time as well as aggression and depression later
on.37 Even without scientific labels, the pain a child feels while living
away from their parent or parents can be understood on a basic
emotional level; their foster parents are not their “real” parents.38
Children of color suffer additional harm when they are removed from
their communities.39 They are likely to experience identity issues
relating to their cultural belonging, affecting their sense of identity and
capacity.40
Grounds for removing a child from their home differ by state, but a
removal may occur when, for instance, there is imminent danger to the
child or risk of injury or death that case workers cannot alleviate by
using available resources.41 As another example, in New York City,
social workers may carry out an emergency removal when they
“determine[] the child is not safe” at home.42 In some jurisdictions,
social workers must file a petition in juvenile court in order to remove.43
Nothing in practice, however, stops workers from threatening

35 See Shanta Trivedi, The Harm of Child Removal, 43 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 523,
528 (2019).
36 Id.
37 See id. (citing Miriam R. Spinner, Maternal-Infant Bonding, 24 CANADIAN FAM.
PHYSICIAN 1151, 1151 (1978)). Studies have also shown that these children are more
likely to experience “low educational attainment, homelessness, unemployment,
economic hardship, unplanned pregnancies, mental health disorders, and criminal
justice involvement.” Alan J. Dettlaff & Reiko Boyd, Racial Disproportionality and
Disparities in the Child Welfare System: Why Do They Exist, and What Can Be Done to
Address Them?, 692 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 253, 255 (2020).
38 See Trivedi, supra note 35, at 528 (citing Jason B. Whiting & Robert E. Lee III,
Voices from the System: A Qualitative Study of Foster Children’s Stories, 52 FAM. REL. 288,
292 (2003)).
39 See Ledesma, supra note 10, at 42.
40 Id.
41 Removal of a Child, N.J. DEP’T CHILD. & FAM. POL’Y MANUAL, https://www.nj.gov/
dcf/policy_manuals/CPP-II-C-2-700_issuance.shtml (also requiring that workers err on
the side of removal and listing examples of when removal should be considered) (last
visited Mar. 14, 2022).
42 Will ACS Take My Child?, ADMIN. CHILD SERVS., https://www1.nyc.gov/site/acs/
child-welfare/will-acs-take-my-child.page (last visited Mar. 14, 2022). But see Yasmeen
Khan, Family Separations in Our Midst, WNYC (Apr. 17, 2019), https://www.wnyc.org/
story/child-removals-emergency-powers/ (revealing ACS caseworkers abuse
discretion in deciding what constitutes an emergency).
43 See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-166 (2020).
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removal;44 and that can be a significant problem when safety plans are
involved.45
Safety plans, also referred to as protection plans, are “agreements
between CPS authorities and parents intended to keep children safe.”46
CPS workers may develop plans with the parent and child, as well as
other people who can keep the family safe.47 Sometimes, safety plans
require no change of custody.48 Some, however, require that custody of
the child be shifted to a relative.49 As discussed in cases later in this
Comment,50 this puts a tremendous burden on parents and extended
family members.51 In cases where removal does not occur, where CPS
sets up a safety plan, the risk that a family’s constitutional rights will be
violated remains; these plans have the potential to be invasive,
overbearing, and coercive.52 Often, parents sign them with the belief
that CPS will take their children away if they refuse.53 The plan’s
requirements can also be excessive, making it difficult for parents to
comply and keep a job at the same time.54
Even without the threat of removal or a safety plan, a mere
accusation of abuse or neglect is enough to terrify a parent.55 The

44 See Joshua Gupta-Kagan, America’s Hidden Foster Care System, 72 STAN. L. REV. 841,
876 (2020).
45 See id. at 848.
46 See id.
47 Id.
48 See id. at 848 n.25.
49 See id. at 849.
50 See Schulkers v. Kammer, 955 F.3d 520 (6th Cir. 2020); infra Part IV.
51 See DIANE L. REDLEAF, THEY TOOK THE KIDS LAST NIGHT 23 (2018) (explaining that the
burden often falls on grandparents, whose lives are disrupted as a result of the safety
plan).
52 See, e.g., id. (discussing the coerciveness of safety plans).
53 Id. at 2, 23; see generally Soledad A. McGrath, Differential Response in Child
Protection Services: Perpetuating the Illusion of Voluntariness, 42 U. MEM. L. REV. 629
(2012).
54 See, e.g., MOVEMENT FOR FAM. POWER, HOW THE FOSTER SYSTEM HAS BECOME GROUND ZERO
FOR THE U.S. DRUG WAR 5–7 (2020) [hereinafter GROUND ZERO], https://static1.square
space.com/static/5be5ed0fd274cb7c8a5d0cba/t/5eead939ca509d4e36a89277/1592
449422870/MFP+Drug+War+Foster+System+Report.pdf. “Service plans” of this kind
are not discussed at length in this Comment, but are relevant to the surveillance and
regulation families, discussed in Part II. Id. at 5. GROUND ZERO tells the story of a woman
whose service plan, which she needed to complete to regain custody of her children,
included parenting classes, anger management classes, parenting classes for children
with special needs, participation in a drug treatment program, submission to surprise
visits from CPS, participation in all court proceedings and conferences and more. Id. All
of this was in response to her truthfully telling a CPS worker that she smoked cannabis
once in a while; most of the classes were not needed and did not apply to her. Id.
55 See REDLEAF, supra note 51, at xviii.
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ensuing investigation can also be traumatic.56 Investigations and
interviews occur after a call comes in and the child abuse hotline
workers screen it for relevance.57 A CPS worker contacts the child (or
another person who may have information) within a specified
timeframe, which varies by jurisdiction.58 The ensuing investigation
and interviews serve to provide a determination or disposition about
the alleged maltreatment.59 Dispositions include: substantiated, where
the allegation of maltreatment or risk thereof is supported by law or
policy; unsubstantiated, where there is insufficient evidence to conclude
that the child was maltreated or at risk; and intentionally false, where
the person alleging maltreatment knew the allegation was not true.60
Investigations and interviews can be invasive and violate the Fourth
Amendment, just as a police officer’s investigation might.61 According
to law Professor Teri Dobbins Baxter, interviews are searches, and when
the child is temporarily taken into custody for an interview, that is a
seizure.62 Therefore, a social worker needs a warrant or consent to
perform them.63 There is a debate surrounding whether there is a
special needs exception for child abuse investigations, which is
discussed in Part IV. The cases discussed in Part IV show that social
workers may interview children at school without their parents’
consent.64 Sometimes investigations can be disturbingly invasive,
involving the examination of children’s bodies,65 or otherwise terrifying
for children.66

56 Baxter, supra note 18, at 125, 127 (“[R]esearch has shown that investigations,
particularly those that are unnecessarily intrusive or that separate children from their
caregivers, can be traumatic and psychologically harmful to the children as well as
damaging to the family as a whole.”) (footnote omitted) (citing Doriane Lambelet
Coleman, Storming the Castle to Save the Children: The Ironic Costs of a Child Welfare
Exception to the Fourth Amendment, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 413, 415, 418–19, 421
(2005)).
57 CHILD MALTREATMENT, supra note 9, at 6.
58 Id. at 10.
59 Id. at 16–17.
60 Id.
61 See Baxter, supra note 18, at 125.
62 Id. at 125–26.
63 See id. at 126.
64 See Schulkers v. Kammer, 955 F.3d 520, 530 (6th Cir. 2020); Capp v. Cnty. of San
Diego, 940 F.3d 1046, 1051 (9th Cir. 2019); Doe v. Woodard, 912 F.3d 1278, 1285–86
(10th Cir. 2019).
65 See Doe, 912 F.3d at 1278; Doriane Lambelet Coleman, Storming the Castle to Save
the Children: The Ironic Costs of a Child Welfare Exception to the Fourth Amendment, 47
WM. & MARY L. REV. 413, 415 (2005).
66 See Schulkers, 955 F.3d at 530 (telling how the children CPS interviewed at school
were afraid of being taken away from their parents).
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Removals, safety plans, and investigations all contribute to the
difficulties CPS-involved families face. To provide a better picture of
who these families are and how they become involved in the system, the
remainder of this Part discusses the history, statistics, and issues that
help explain the system’s disparities.
A. History and Race
It is difficult to know where to start when discussing the history of
the child welfare system. If one were to focus on the separation of
children from their families, then the history would begin with slavery67
and continue with the removal of Native American children from their
homes in the late 19th century and well into the 20th century.68 America
has a long history of removing children of color from their families.69
The CPS system as we know it (and for the purposes of this Comment),
however, began in the 1960s.70 In 1962, Henry Kempe and his
colleagues published “The Battered-Child Syndrome,” which created
awareness of child abuse, gave doctors a way to understand it, and
provided information on how to report it.71 Not long after, with society’s
heightened awareness of physical and sexual abuse, Congress passed
the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act of 1974 (“CAPTA”).72
This law conditioned federal funds on the states setting up systems to
investigate reports of child neglect (physical, emotional, and academic)
and abuse.73 With this passage, reports to CPS skyrocketed from 10,000
in 1967 to 300,000 by 1975.74 Now, the numbers are even higher: in
2019, approximately 4,378,000 referrals were made to CPS.75
The disproportionality of the child welfare system is still apparent
today. It is so obvious that, as Dorothy Roberts notes, if you observed
the system without knowing the CPS system had the purpose of helping
children, “you would have to conclude that it is an institution designed
67 See LAURA BRIGGS, TAKING CHILDREN: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN TERROR 19 (2020) (“[T]he
threat that children could be taken from kin and caregivers was one of the ‘essential
features’ of enslavement, as . . . W.E.B. DuBois wrote . . . .”).
68 See id. at 50–51, 56.
69 See generally id. at 67 (detailing America’s history of taking children as a way to
oppress Black, Native American, and Latinx families); see also Detlaff & Boyd, supra note
37, at 258–59.
70 Michael S. Wald, Beyond CPS: Developing an Effective System for Helping Children
in “Neglectful” Families, 41 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 49, 53 (2015).
71 See C. Henry Kempe et al., The Battered-Child Syndrome, 181 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 17
(1962), reprinted in 9 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 143 (1985).
72 See Wald, supra note 70, at 53.
73 See id.
74 Id.
75 CHILD MALTREATMENT, supra note 9, at 7.
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to monitor, regulate, and punish poor Black families.”76 At every
juncture of the CPS system—reporting, investigation, substantiation,
and foster care placement and exit—children of color are
overrepresented.77 In 2020, Black children made up 14 percent of the
child population,78 yet they made up 23 percent of the foster care
population.79 Similarly, Native American and Alaska Native children
made up 1 percent of the child population80 yet constituted 2 percent of
the foster care population.81 Aside from removals, mere investigation
numbers show the disparity. 37 percent of all children will experience
a CPS investigation before turning eighteen.82 That number alone is
disquieting. But perhaps more jarring is this fact: 53 percent of Black
children experience an investigation by the time they turn eighteen.83

DOROTHY ROBERTS, SHATTERED BONDS: THE COLOR OF CHILD WELFARE 6 (2002).
Cooper, supra note 29, at 258.
78 CHILD POPULATION BY RACE IN THE UNITED STATES, KIDS COUNT, https://datacenter.
kidscount.org/data/tables/103-child-population-by-race#detailed/1/any/false/574,
1729,37,871,870,573,869,36,868,867/68,69,67,12,70,66,71,72/423,424 (last updated
Sept. 2021).
79 CHILD.’S BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., THE AFCARS REPORT 2 (2021)
[hereinafter
AFCARS
REPORT],
https://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/
documents/cb/afcarsreport28.pdf. The same was true of 2019, CHILD.’S BUREAU, U.S.
DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., THE AFCARS REPORT 2 (2020), https://www.acf.hhs.gov/
sites/default/files/documents/cb/afcarsreport27.pdf, and 2018, Sankaran, supra note
12. This disproportionality has improved, however; in 2009, Black children constituted
30 percent of the foster care population. CHILD.’S BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM.
SERVS., THE AFCARS REPORT 2 (2009), https://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/
documents/cb/afcarsreport17.pdf.
80 CHILD POPULATION BY RACE IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 78.
81 AFCARS REPORT, supra note 79, at 2. It should be noted, however, that this
disproportionality has improved since the enactment of the Indian Child Welfare Act
(ICWA) in 1978; in the 1970s, 25 percent to 35 percent of all Native children were
removed. About ICWA, NAT’L INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ASS’N, https://www.nicwa.org/abouticwa/ (last visited Apr. 23, 2021). Also, compare these numbers to non-Hispanic white
children, who make up 50 percent of the child population, CHILD POPULATION BY RACE IN
THE UNITED STATES, supra note 78, yet constitute 43 percent of the foster care population,
AFCARS REPORT, supra note 79, at 2. Hispanic or Latinx children are 26 percent of the
child population, CHILD POPULATION BY RACE IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 78, and 22
percent of the foster care population, AFCARS REPORT, supra note 79, at 2. Asian children
make up 5 percent of the child population, CHILD POPULATION BY RACE IN THE UNITED STATES,
supra note 78, and 1 percent of the foster care population, AFCARS REPORT, supra note
79, at 2.
82 Hyunil Kim et al., Lifetime Prevalence of Investigating Child Maltreatment Among
US Children, AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 274, 277 (2017).
83 Id. Compare that number to 32 percent of Hispanic children, 28.2 percent of white
children, 23.4 percent of Native American children, and 10.2 percent of Asian or Pacific
Islander children. Id.
76
77
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B. Poverty
Low-income families and communities are also overrepresented in
the child welfare system.84 It may be that a causal connection exists
between poverty and CPS involvement.85 For instance, some research
suggests that parents under high chronic stress due to poverty are more
vulnerable to alcohol abuse, which may inhibit parenting capacity.86 But
states frequently define neglect as a failure to provide food, clothing,
shelter, medical care, or supervision.87 Often what workers consider a
failure is simply an inability to find adequate housing,88 food,89 or a
babysitter.90 Indigent parents, therefore, live in fear of CPS knocking at
their doors.91
There are also a few aspects of poverty that make indigent parents
more likely to be surveilled and reported and therefore

See Kelley Fong, Child Welfare Involvement and Contexts of Poverty: The Role of
Parental Adversities, Social Networks, and Social Services, 72 CHILD. & YOUTH SERVS. REV. 5,
5 (2017); Maren K. Dale, Addressing the Underlying Issue of Poverty in Child-Neglect
Cases, AM. BAR ASS’N (Apr. 10, 2014), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/
committees/childrens-rights/articles/2014/addressing-underlying-issue-povertychild-neglect-cases/.
85 See Fong, supra note 84, at 5.
86 See id. at 6.
87 CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., DEFINITIONS OF
CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT 2 (Mar. 2019), https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs/
define.pdf.
88 See Amy Dworsky, Families at the Nexus of Housing and Child Welfare, STATE POL’Y
ADVOC. & REFORM CTR. (Nov. 2014), http://childwelfaresparc.org/wp-content/uploads/
2014/12/Families-at-the-Nexus-of-Housing-and-Child-Welfare.pdf (explaining the
relationship between housing and child welfare system involvement).
89 See Sharkkarah Harrison, The Do’s and Don’ts of Parenting While Poor, RISE (Nov.
6, 2017), https://www.risemagazine.org/2017/11/the-dos-and-donts-of-parentingwhile-poor/ (advising parents to “try to have food in your home at all times.”).
90 Elizabeth Brico, Poverty Isn’t Neglect, But the State Took My Children Anyway, TALK
POVERTY (Nov. 16, 2018), https://talkpoverty.org/2018/11/16/poverty-neglect-statetook-children/ (written by a parent who had her children removed for neglect due to
poverty).
91 See id.; Katherine Joyce, The Crime of Parenting While Poor, NEW REPUBLIC (Feb. 25,
2019),
https://newrepublic.com/article/153062/crime-parenting-poor-new-yorkcity-child-welfare-agency-reform; Emma S. Ketteringham, Live in a Poor Neighborhood?
Better Be a Perfect Parent, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 22, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/
2017/08/22/opinion/poor-neighborhoods-black-parents-child-services.html?_r=0.
See Harrison, supra note 89, for an article on the steps poor parents need to take in order
to avoid a CPS investigation. It is also worth noting that the COVID-19 pandemic has
sent 2.5 million children below the poverty line since May 2020. Jason DeParle, 8 Million
Have Slipped Into Poverty Since May as Federal Aid Has Dried Up, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 15,
2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/15/us/politics/federal-aid-poverty-levels
.html?smtyp=cur&smid=tw-nytimes. Thus, the problem has been exacerbated.
84
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overrepresented.92 Bias has a role.93 Mandatory reporters, like
doctors,94 may be more inclined to report perceived maltreatment
based on social class.95 Additionally, low-income families often use
public programs, causing them to come into contact with public officials
(who also may be mandatory reporters)96 more often; this consequently
increases their visibility and the chances that someone will report them
to CPS.97
C. Mandatory and Anonymous Reporting
Inside and outside the context of poverty, mandated reporting has
been subject to some controversy.98 The laws surrounding mandatory
reporting put the burden on mandated reporters like teachers, daycare
workers, and doctors99 to report suspected abuse and neglect.100 In
addition to the sense of guilt that likely accompanies a failure to act in
the face of suspected neglect or abuse, forty-nine states, Washington,
D.C., American Samoa, Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico,
and the Virgin Islands impose some kind of penalty on mandatory
reporters who knowingly or willfully fail to report suspected child
maltreatment.101 Moreover, at least some of these reporters likely feel
they are helping the family by calling CPS.102

92 See Fong, supra note 84, at 6 (“[W]elfare sanctions or employment changes predict
. . . investigation, but not additional child welfare involvement, suggesting that economic
factors may shape the . . . report more so than the underlying behavior.”).
93 See id.
94 See CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., MANDATORY
REPORTERS OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT 2 (Apr. 2019) [hereinafter MANDATORY REPORTERS],
https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs/manda.pdf.
95 See Fong, supra note 84, at 6.
96 MANDATORY REPORTERS, supra note 94, at 2.
97 See Ledesma, supra note 10, at 47; Fong, supra note 84, at 6; see also CHILD WELFARE
INFO. GATEWAY, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., RACIAL DISPROPORTIONALITY AND DISPARITY
IN CHILD WELFARE 6 (Nov. 2016), https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubpdfs/racial_disproportionality.pdf.
98 See Gary B. Melton, Mandated Reporting: A Policy Without Reason, 29 CHILD ABUSE
& NEGLECT 9, 10 (2005); Kathryn S. Krase, Differences in Racially Disproportionate
Reporting of Child Maltreatment Across Report Sources, 7 J. PUB. CHILD WELFARE 351
(2013).
99 See MANDATORY REPORTERS, supra note 94, at 2.
100 See Harrison, supra note 89.
101 CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., PENALTIES FOR
FAILURE TO REPORT AND FALSE REPORTING OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT 2 (Feb. 2019)
[hereinafter PENALTIES], https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs/report.pdf. In most
states, the failure is a misdemeanor, but in Florida it is a felony. Id.
102 See Melton, supra note 98, at 12 (telling the story of a well-meaning neighbor who
calls CPS on a mother who struggles to feed and provide supervision of her children).
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Most states allow reporters to remain anonymous if they choose.103
This means that the reporter does not have to disclose their identity to
the hotline.104 This also presents problems. Though anonymous reports
are rare,105 they are not regulated and are susceptible to abuse.106 For
instance, some perpetrators of domestic violence anonymously make
false reports to CPS to assert power and control over their victims.107
This discredits the victims’ ability to parent and subjects them to further
trauma through CPS investigations.108 The fact that the reports are
anonymous means CPS does not track them, and therefore neither CPS
nor anyone else can stop abusers from repeatedly making false
reports.109 Moreover, there are no penalties for false reporting if the
caller is anonymous.110
But even where calls are not anonymous, false reporting does
occur.111 Though it is a rare occurrence,112 anyone from disgruntled
neighbors, friends, family members, or exes may make a false report in
retaliation.113
D. Drug Use
Drug use and CPS’s assumptions about it (for instance, the
assumption that drug use causes bad parenting) also affect reporting
and CPS involvement. As already mentioned, sometimes substance
abuse can lead to neglect.114 But in many jurisdictions, CPS and courts
conflate evidence of drug use with a risk of harm—even where there is
See MANDATORY REPORTERS, supra note 94, at 4.
CHILD MALTREATMENT, supra note 9, at 115.
105 Only 6.5 percent of reports were from anonymous sources in 2019. Id. at 9.
106 See Dale Margolin Cecka, Abolish Anonymous Reporting to Child Abuse Hotlines, 64
CATH. U. L. REV. 51, 52 (2014).
107 See Keyna Franklin, Melissa Landrau, & Sara Werner, False and Malicious Reports:
Why NY Should End Anonymous Reporting, RISE (Sept. 1, 2020), https://www.risemagazine.org/2020/09/false-and-malicious-reports-why-ny-should-end-anonymous-reporting/.
108 See id.
109 See id.
110 See Cecka, supra note 106, at 52. Even if the reports are not anonymous; only
twenty-nine states and Puerto Rico have penalties for false reporting. PENALTIES, supra
note 101, at 3.
111 See CHILD MALTREATMENT, supra note 9, at 30.
112 See id.
113 See, e.g., Kathryn S. Krase, Social Workers as Mandated Reporters: What Happens If
I’m Wrong? The Immunity Provision, Part IV, THE NEW SOC. WORKER (Winter 2014),
https://www.socialworker.com/feature-articles/practice/social-workers-as-mandated-reporters-what-happens-if-im-wrong/; see also Fong, supra note 84, at 6.
114 CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., PARENTAL
SUBSTANCE USE AS CHILD ABUSE (July 2019), https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs/parentalsubstanceuse.pdf.
103
104
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no evidence of actual harm.115 This is despite there being no conclusive
study that establishes a link between drug use and maltreatment.116
This is also a point of disparity; low-income, Black, Native American, and
Latinx families use drugs at a rate similar to their wealthier white
counterparts,117 but CPS is more likely to target the former, and people
are more likely to report them.118
E. Surveillance
Surveillance of certain poor communities of color is another
malady of the CPS system.119 In New York City, for instance, the number
of children in foster care has decreased, but investigations concentrated
in certain communities have increased.120 As already discussed,
investigations are themselves traumatic. When investigations lead to
court-ordered supervision, we see surveillance on an individual level.121
As Rise Magazine reports, 10,000 families in New York City had to report
to the court on family matters in 2017.122 One parent detailed how
difficult it was to comply with instructions, which required her to take
off work multiple times; it eventually resulted in her losing her job.123
Similarly, having their names on the child abuse registry if abuse was
“indicated”124 may affect parents’ ability to obtain employment.125
F. Bias and the Discretion of Social Workers
The foregoing information suggests an explanation for the over
four million calls CPS gets every year and how low-income, Black, and
Native American families are disproportionately involved in the
115 See Jasmine Harris, Child Abuse and Cannabis Use: How a Prima Facie Standard
Mischaracterizes Parental Cannabis Consumption as Child Neglect, 41 CARDOZO L. REV.
2761, 2762–63 (2020); see also Schulkers v. Kammer, 955 F.3d 520 (6th Cir. 2020); infra
Part IV.
116 Harris, supra note 115, at 2765 (explaining that researchers are unable to
determine conclusively that marijuana use is a direct cause of child maltreatment).
117 GROUND ZERO, supra note 54, at 15.
118 REDLEAF, supra note 51, at xix (explaining that one study found that prenatal drug
use was reported at a rate eleven times higher for Black women than for white women,
though actual use was the same).
119 See Surveillance Isn’t Safety—How Over-Reporting and CPS Monitoring Stress
Families and Weaken Communities, RISE (Sept. 17, 2019) [hereinafter Surveillance Isn’t
Safety], https://www.risemagazine.org/2019/09/surveillance-isnt-safety/.
120 Id.
121 See Surveillance Isn’t Safety, supra note 119.
122 Id.
123 Id.; see also GROUND ZERO, supra note 54, at 5–7.
124 A disposition of “indicated” abuse or neglect is when maltreatment is suspected,
but cannot be substantiated. CHILD MALTREATMENT, supra note 9, at 16.
125 See REDLEAF, supra note 51, at 38, 40–42.
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system.126 Of those referrals, over 45 percent are screened out for
irrelevance or lack of information.127 Most of the remaining reports are
investigated by a caseworker.128 This is another juncture where biases
play a role—specifically, the biases of CPS workers.
Social workers have broad discretion and must use their judgment
to determine when children are at risk of harm and the appropriate
response.129 Often, they do so with little factual information in an
overwhelmed state, creating “strained decision-making conditions.”130
Unfortunately, this presents the opportunity for them to make
inferences based on their pre-existing ideas of the families they are
investigating.131 For instance, social workers—most of whom are
middle class and white132—may tend to compare families to a “norm”
that is middle class and white.133 Thus, stereotypes such as Black
mothers as “unfit,” Black fathers as “uninvolved,”134 and low-income
families as neglectful135 are allowed to influence their decisionmaking.136 While there are several resources designed to mitigate
implicit bias in the child welfare system,137 scholars suggest that
increased testing for implicit bias is needed to address the problem.138
126 See CHILD MALTREATMENT, supra note 9, at 7. See also Joyce McMillan & Jessica
Prince, Opinion: The Press is Stoking Fears of a Phantom Child-Abuse Crisis, CITY LIMITS
(June 29, 2020), https://citylimits.org/2020/06/29/opinion-the-press-is-stokingfears-of-a-phantom-child-abuse-crisis/, for the assertion that the drop in child neglect
and abuse reporting during the COVID-19 lockdown was not due to the fact that the
abuse was “hidden,” but that most calls pre-lockdown were unmerited.
127 CHILD MALTREATMENT, supra note 9, at 12.
128 Id. at 16.
129 See Cooper, supra note 29, at 252; Sankaran, supra note 12.
130 See Kathleen Simon, Note, Catalyzing the Separation of Black Families: A Critique
of Foster Care Placements Without Prior Judicial Review, 51 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 347,
361–62 (2018) (explaining how CPS workers are overworked, under trained, and
lacking information).
131 See id. at 362.
132 See Ledesma, supra note 10, at 51.
133 See id. at 52.
134 Simon, supra note 130, at 353.
135 See Ledesma, supra note 10, at 32.
136 See id. at 51–52. For a study on social worker implicit bias, see, for example, Sheila
D. Ards et al., Racialized Perceptions and Child Neglect, 34 CHILD & YOUTH SERVS. REV. 1480
(2012).
137 See, e.g., Krista Ellis, Race and Poverty Bias in the Child Welfare System: Strategies
for Child Welfare Practitioners, AM. BAR ASS’N (Dec. 17, 2019), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/public_interest/child_law/resources/child_law_practiceonline/
january—-december-2019/race-and-poverty-bias-in-the-child-welfare-system—strategies-f/; Implicit Bias 101: Exploring Implicit Bias in Child Protection, KIRWAN INST.,
https://kirwaninstitute.osu.edu/implicit-bias-101 (last visited Jan. 13, 2020).
138 See, e.g., Marian S. Harris, Racial Bias as an Explanatory Factor for Racial
Disproportionality and Disparities in Child Welfare, in 11 RACIAL DISPROPORTIONALITY AND
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Fighting this bias takes place at an individual level as well as a
systemic level, which is discussed briefly at the end of this Comment.
There are times, however, when a social worker’s conduct goes beyond
a good faith ignorance of culture and poverty and enters a realm of
carelessness and disregard for families.139 That is the point where
deterrable and preventable unconstitutional conduct may occur. This
conduct is deterrable because holding social workers liable for
intentional conduct may help protect the rights of families. It is
preventable because some aspects of the system are undoubtedly to
blame.
III. THE RATIONALE FOR SOCIAL WORKER IMMUNITY
Social workers are entitled to qualified immunity as government
officials. Because they also sometimes perform certain functions
associated with the judicial process, like initiating proceedings, they
may also be entitled to absolute immunity. This Part offers a brief
overview of each form of immunity, how they came to apply to social
workers, and why or why not such immunity is inappropriate.
A. A Brief Overview of Immunity
Qualified immunity is a judicially created doctrine that protects
government officials from civil liability when their conduct does not
violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would have known.140 In deciding whether an official
is entitled to qualified immunity, a court must use a two-prong test: it
must decide whether the plaintiff has alleged a violation of a
constitutional right and whether that right was clearly established at the
time of the defendant’s conduct.141 The court uses its discretion in
deciding which of these two prongs to evaluate first.142 In deciding
whether the right was clearly established, the “‘law’ should not be
defined ‘at a high level of generality.’”143 There must be a “fair warning”
DISPARITIES IN THE CHILD WELFARE SYSTEM 141, 154 (Alan J. Dettlaff ed., 2021) (calling for
increased testing and moderating of implicit bias using tests such as the Implicit
Association Test (“IAT”), Affect Misattribution Procedure (“AMP”), and Implicit
Relational Assessment procedure (“IRAP”)).
139 See infra Part IV.
140 See NOVAK, supra note 2, at 1; see also Joanna C. Schwartz, The Case Against
Qualified Immunity, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1797, 1803 (2018) (explaining that the
Supreme Court “created qualified immunity” in Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967));
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
141 Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009).
142 Id. at 236.
143 White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548, 552 (2017) (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S.
731, 742 (2011)).
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that the alleged conduct was unconstitutional.144 A right is not clearly
established just because it would be in another jurisdiction. It must be
binding on the court considering the issue, or there must be a consensus
of cases of persuasive authority.145
What is the rationale behind giving officials such broad immunity?
Originally, when the Supreme Court applied qualified immunity to a §
1983 claim in Pierson v. Ray in 1967, the purpose was to protect officials
acting in good faith from liability.146 In Harlow v. Fitzgerald, the Court
said qualified immunity prevents costs “to society as a whole” like the
expenses of litigation, “diversion of official energy,” the “deterrence of
able citizens from acceptance of public office,” and the danger that the
“fear of being sued will ‘dampen the ardor of . . . [public officials], in the
unflinching discharge of their duties.’”147 More recently, the Supreme
Court has framed the last rationale as serving to give officials “breathing
room” to make judgments.148
Absolute or judicial immunity stems from English common law.149
It is absolute, meaning that even if judges act maliciously or corruptly,
they are not liable unless there is a “clear absence of all jurisdiction.”150
As with qualified immunity, in Pierson v. Ray, the Court held that
absolute immunity is an available defense in § 1983 suits.151
Importantly, when a court applies absolute immunity, it does not do so
automatically just because the defendant is a judge; rather, the court
looks at the defendant’s acts. Absolute immunity applies only to judicial
acts—not administrative, legislative, or executive functions that a judge
may perform.152

Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002).
See Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 617 (1999).
146 See generally Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967); see Schwartz, supra note 140, at
1803 & n.38.
147 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814 (1982) (quoting Gregoire v. Biddle, 177
F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949)).
148 Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 743 (2011).
149 See Brittney Kern, Comment, Giving New Meaning to “Justice for All”: Crafting an
Exception to Absolute Judicial Immunity, 2014 MICH. STATE L. REV. 149, 154 (2014) (citing
Floyd & Barker, (1607) 77 Eng. Rep. 1305, 1305; 5 Co. Rep. 23, 23); see also Pierson v.
Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553–54 (1967) (“Few doctrines were more solidly established at
common law than the immunity of judges from liability for damages for acts committed
within their judicial jurisdiction . . . .”). Absolute immunity also extends to legislators,
prosecutors, and witnesses. Kern, supra, at 153.
150 Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335, 351 (1871).
151 Pierson, 386 U.S. at 554 (“The legislative record [for § 1983] gives no clear
indication that Congress meant to abolish . . . common-law immunities.”).
152 See Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 227 (1988).
144
145
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It is this functional approach that allowed the expansion of
absolute immunity to other officials performing judicial acts.153 In
Imbler v. Pachtman, the Supreme Court applied this quasi-judicial
immunity to prosecutors sued under § 1983.154 The Court held that
initiating a prosecution and presenting the State’s case were acts
“intimately associated” with the judicial process and, therefore, those
prosecutorial activities were covered by absolute immunity.155 The
rationale for both judicial and quasi-judicial absolute immunity is the
same,156 and it is similar to the rationale for qualified immunity. The
Court in Imbler recognized a need for keeping prosecutors from the
distraction of litigation and encouraging the exercise of independent
judgment.157 Less than absolute immunity, it said, “would disserve the
broader public interest” by preventing “vigorous” performance of
prosecutors’ duties.158 It also considered that because prosecutors act
under significant time constraints and sometimes with little
information, prosecutors inevitably make decisions that might violate
the Constitution.159 It recognized that, like judges, prosecutors had
other ways to deter misconduct, like professional discipline or criminal
liability.160
While the Supreme Court has never addressed social worker
absolute immunity,161 several lower courts have applied it.162 Some of
these courts have likened the discretion that social workers have to
initiate child protection proceedings to prosecutorial discretion to
initiate proceedings.163 Actions like this are “intimately associated with
the judicial process.”164

153 See Margaret Z. Johns, A Black Robe Is Not a Big Tent: The Improper Expansion of
Absolute Judicial Immunity to Non-Judges in Civil-Rights Cases, 59 S.M.U. L. REV. 265, 274
(2006); Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 514 (1978).
154 Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 438 (1976).
155 Id. at 430–31.
156 See id. at 422–23.
157 See id. at 423.
158 Id. at 427.
159 See id. at 425.
160 Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 429 (1976).
161 See Johns, supra note 153, at 288.
162 See, e.g., Turner v. Lowen, No. 19-6235, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 23446, at *1–2 (6th
Cir. July 24, 2020); Costanich v. Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs., 627 F.3d 1101, 1103 (9th
Cir. 2010); Hughes v. Long, 242 F.3d 121, 125–26 (3d Cir. 2001); Millspaugh v. Cnty.
Dep’t of Pub. Welfare 937 F.2d 1172, 1172 (7th Cir. 1991).
163 See Johns, supra note 153, at 286–87.
164 Turner, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 23446, at *9 (citing Pittman v. Cuyahoga Cnty. Dep’t
of Child. & Fam. Servs., 640 F.3d 716, 725 (6th Cir. 2011)).
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B. Common Criticisms of Immunity
Some scholars have criticized qualified immunity as not having a
basis in law.165 Nothing in § 1983—neither the original version166 nor
the statute as it is now—indicates that officials are entitled to
immunity.167 Nor is there a basis in the common law.168 At the time
Congress passed the original version of the statute in 1871, officials who
committed illegal acts were liable without regard to subjective intent.169
In fact, in Myers v. Anderson, the Court rejected the argument that an
official could assert a good faith defense to a § 1983 claim.170 When the
Court decided Pierson v. Ray,171 however, it allowed for that defense
under § 1983, contradicting its own precedent and common law.172
Perhaps more importantly, qualified immunity “hamper[s] the
development of constitutional law.”173 The Supreme Court set a narrow
definition of “clearly established,” and that definition has become even
narrower over time.174 In order to have a clearly established right, there
must be binding precedent or a consensus of persuasive authority that
involves an official “acting under similar circumstances.”175 While the
Court said that there does not need to be a prior case “directly on
point,”176 it has reversed denials of qualified immunity where there was
failure “to identify a case where an officer acting under similar
circumstances” violated the Constitution.177 Also hindering the
development of constitutional doctrine is the Supreme Court’s grant of

165 See William Baude, Is Qualified Immunity Unlawful?, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 45, 47
(2018); Schwartz, supra note 140, at 1801 (noting that there is no basis for qualified
immunity in common law); see also Jay Schweikert, Qualified Immunity: A Legal,
Practical, and Moral Failure, CATO INST. (Sept. 14, 2020), https://www.cato.org/
publications/policy-analysis/qualified-immunity-legal-practical-moral-failure.
166 See An Act to Enforce the Provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States, and for Other Purposes, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13 (1871)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
167 See 42 U.S.C.S. § 1983 (West 2021); Baude, supra note 165, at 49–50.
168 See Schwartz, supra note 140, at 1801.
169 Id.
170 See Baude, supra note 165, at 57–58; Myers v. Anderson, 238 U.S. 368, 378–79
(1915).
171 See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 557 (1967).
172 See Schwartz, supra note 140, at 1802 (citing Albert W. Alschuler, Herring v.
United States: A Minnow or a Shark?, 7 OHIO STATE J. CRIM. L. 463, 504 (2010)).
173 Schwartz, supra note 140, at 1800.
174 See id. at 1814.
175 See id. at 1815–16 (quoting White v. Pauly 137 S. Ct. 548, 552 (2017)).
176 Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 308 (2015) (citation omitted).
177 White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548, 551–52 (2017).
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discretion in deciding which prong to consider first.178 If a court decides
to analyze whether a right is clearly established first, and finds it was
not, it does not have to decide if the officer violated a constitutional
right.179 Thus, even if another plaintiff brings a factually similar case,
the right is still not “clearly established” because the conduct in the
previous case was not found to be unconstitutional.180 As law Professor
Joanna C. Schwartz has articulated, the combination of a narrow
definition of a clearly established law and the discretion of courts to
choose which prong to evaluate first creates a “vicious cycle.”181
In this sense, as Justice Sotomayor dissented in Mullenix v. Luna,
qualified immunity “renders the protections of the Fourth Amendment
hollow.”182 It ultimately signals to officials that they can act first and
think later about whether their conduct was constitutional—without
any consequences.183 But, of course, there are consequences for the
victims denied justice. Additionally, qualified immunity may discourage
people from bringing suits in the first place.184
As for absolute quasi-judicial immunity, the fact that prosecutors
can avoid liability even when their actions lead to wrongful convictions
has been said to add to the “criminal legal machine” that facilitates mass
incarceration.185 While the Supreme Court cited professional discipline
and criminal liability as proper deterrents against prosecutorial
misconduct, these measures are rarely used against prosecutors.186
The Supreme Court itself has not addressed absolute immunity as
it applies to social workers, but in dissent to a denial of certiorari, Justice
Thomas briefly discussed it.187 Justice Thomas expressed doubt as to
whether social workers’ activities were similar to that of prosecutors,
178 See Schwartz, supra note 140, at 1815 (citing Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223,
223–24 (2009)).
179 Id.
180 Id. at 1815–16; see, e.g., Schulkers v. Kammer, 955 F.3d 520, 535–36 (6th Cir.
2020) (recognizing that the court did not need to consider whether a constitutional right
was violated because it first determined that the law was not clearly established, but
deciding to address the question anyway to “promote[] the development of
constitutional precedent”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
181 Schwartz, supra note 140, at 1815.
182 Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 20–21, 26 (2015) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
183 See id. As Justice Sotomayor wrote, the decision “sanction[ed] a ‘shoot first, think
later’ approach to policing . . . .” Id. at 26.
184 Schwartz, supra note 140, at 1818.
185 See Kate Levine & Joanna Schwartz, Hold Prosecutors Accountable, Too, BOS. REV.
(June 18, 2020), http://bostonreview.net/law-justice/kate-levine-joanna-schwartzhold-prosecutors-accountable-too.
186 See Margaret Z. Johns, Reconsidering Absolute Prosecutorial Immunity, 2005 BYU
L. REV. 53, 70–71 (2005).
187 Hoffman v. Harris, 114 S. Ct. 1631, 1632–33 (1994) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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while also pointing out that social worker absolute immunity could not
stand on its own because it has no basis in common law; the immunity,
and indeed social workers, did not exist in 1871 at the time that § 1983
was first enacted.188
C. Social Workers and Immunity
Whether or not qualified and quasi-judicial immunity fulfill their
intended goals, their rationales might also apply to social workers.
Social workers must make difficult decisions.189 Perhaps giving them
some “breathing room” in that decision-making is in their best interest.
Likewise, they might do their jobs best when not distracted by litigation
or the threat thereof. Perhaps the threat of liability would “dampen
[their] ardor” in performing their duties.190
Additionally, like
prosecutors, they often act under time constraints191 and with limited
information,192 which inevitably makes it likely they will, at times,
violate the Constitution.
As Justice Thomas indicated, there might be other policy reasons to
justify immunity for social workers besides a functional analogy to
judges or prosecutors or historical justification.193 The following
discussion addresses some of those reasons.
First of all, a social worker’s job is very difficult and is hindered by
a lack of resources, including training.194 Most importantly, social

188 See id. (citing Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 489 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in
judgment and dissenting in part); see also Johns, supra note 153, at 285.
189 See JAMES PAYNE, PUB. CONSULTING GRP. HUM. SERVS., BEYOND QUICK FIXES: WHAT WILL IT
REALLY TAKE TO IMPROVE CHILD WELFARE IN AMERICA? PAPER TWO: CASEWORKERS ARE FIRST
RESPONDERS. THEY DESERVE THE SAME PROFESSIONALIZATION AS OTHER ESSENTIAL PERSONNEL 2
(June 10, 2014), https://www.publicconsultinggroup.com/media/1352/caseworkers_
are_first_responders_whitepaper.pdf.
190 See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814 (1982) (quoting Gregoire v. Biddle, 177
F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949)).
191 See A Day in the Life of a CPS Social Worker: It’s a Mess, THE DOE (Sept. 2020),
https://www.thedoe.com/narratives/day-in-life-cps-social-worker
(“I
regularly
clocked 15-plus hour days . . . .”); Austin Griffiths et al., “The Stress Is Indescribable”: SelfReported Health Implications From Child Welfare Supervisors, 38 CLINICAL SUPERVISORS
183, 190 (2019) (detailing unhealthy eating habits due to skipping lunches and working
past dinners).
192 See Gupta-Kagan, supra note 44, at 877 (explaining how workers work off of
“imperfect information”).
193 Hoffman v. Harris, 114 S. Ct. 1631, 1633 (1994).
194 See Claire Burke, Newly Qualified Social Workers Have No Time for Training, Study
Finds, GUARDIAN (Dec. 11, 2012, 3:30 PM) https://www.theguardian.com/social-carenetwork/2012/dec/11/newly-qualified-social-workers-no-time-training; Families in
Crisis: DSS Training Issues Put Children in Danger, ABC 13 NEWS (June 13, 2018),
https://wlos.com/news/local/dss-families-in-crisis-training-issues.
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workers are overburdened with caseloads often exceeding the
recommended number.195
Even if the caseloads were within the recommended range, it
would not likely make the job much easier. In many ways, social
workers function as first responders. On a daily basis, they must make
potentially life or death decisions, either over the phone or on a visit to
a family.196 Additionally, they witness the trauma that children and
families experience and have to review and relive it repeatedly.197 With
this pressure and exposure to trauma, along with the stress of the
system’s environment itself,198 social workers sometimes experience
mental health consequences like compassion fatigue,199 secondary
traumatic stress,200 and burnout.201 Given the long hours, one could
hardly find that the money makes it worth it.202
Among the difficult decisions previously mentioned lies perhaps
the most difficult of all: the decision of whether to remove a child. Thus,
it is worthwhile to address this aspect of the social worker’s job in
particular. Removals can be traumatic for both children and families,
yet sometimes children’s safety is so seriously at risk that they must be
removed from the home. When social workers face such a difficult
decision, does the possibility of immunity have an effect on it?
PAYNE, supra note 189, at 2.
Id. at 2.
197 Id. at 3.
198 See Stress and the Child Welfare Workforce: Recognizing Signs of Secondary
Traumatic Stress, QUALITY IMPROVEMENT CTR. WORKFORCE DEV. (July 2, 2018),
https://www.qic-wd.org/blog/stress-and-child-welfare-workforce-recognizing-signssecondary-traumatic-stress (listing “[b]ureaucratic rules, paperwork, work overload,
role confusion, high demands with low resources, high levels of office politics, unfair
practices, and other forms of negative organizational culture and climate” as sources of
stress).
199 See David Turgoose & Lucy Maddox, Predictors of Compassion Fatigue in Mental
Health Professionals: A Narrative Review, 23 TRAUMATOLOGY 172, 172 (2017)
(“Compassion fatigue [is] the empathic strain and general exhaustion . . . from dealing
with people in distress . . . . It is characterized by physical and emotional exhaustion and
. . . reduction in the ability to feel empathy and compassion for others.”).
200 See Stress and the Child Welfare Workforce: Recognizing Signs of Secondary
Traumatic Stress, supra note 198; Brian E. Bride, Prevalence of Secondary Traumatic
Stress Among Social Workers, 53 SOC. WORK 63, 63 (2007) (“[Secondary traumatic stress]
is the stress resulting from helping or wanting to help a traumatized or suffering
person.”).
201 See Dnika J. Travis et al., ‘I’m So Stressed!’: A Longitudinal Model of Stress, Burnout
and Engagement among Social Workers in Child Welfare Settings, 46 BRIT. J. SOC. WORK
1076, 1076 (2016) (defining burnout as emotional exhaustion and depersonalization).
202 The annual pay for social workers has a wide range. Annual pay by state ranges
from $37,190 in Mississippi to $71,590 in Washington, D.C., with the average being
$49,448. Maura Deering, Social Work Salaries and Hiring Outlook, SOC. WORK GUIDE (Oct.
12, 2020), https://www.socialworkguide.org/salaries/.
195
196
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In DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services, the
Supreme Court held that social workers could not be held liable under §
1983 for leaving a child with abusive parents in the event the child got
hurt.203 The petitioners in that case were Joshua DeShaney, a child
whose father had abused and permanently injured him after CPS had
failed to remove him from the home, and his mother.204 CPS social
workers knew that the father abused Joshua and ignored many warning
signs that Joshua was at risk for serious injury.205 The petitioners sued
CPS under § 1983 for violating the child’s Fourteenth Amendment
substantive due process rights.206
Specifically, the petitioners
contended that by failing to protect Joshua, CPS deprived him of his
“liberty interest in ‘free[dom] from . . . unjustified intrusions on personal
security.’”207 The Court rejected the argument that CPS owed him an
affirmative duty under the Constitution to protect against private
actors’ invasion.208 It held that the State is only responsible for safety
and well-being when it takes a person into custody against that person’s
will.209 Thus, CPS could not be held liable for failing to remove a child.210
Law Professor Rebecca Aviel has argued that the Court’s holding in
DeShaney has made immunity for social workers necessary.211 She
claims that without absolute immunity, social workers have more of an
incentive to leave a child in an abusive household than to risk liability
for wrongful removal.212 But this is not necessarily true. Even the Court
in DeShaney articulated that CPS might have acquired a duty to protect
Joshua under state tort law, so petitioners might sue under that cause of
action.213 Moreover, when a caseworker fails to remove a child, the
media and the public take notice of it; there is an element of shame.214
See DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 202 (1989).
See id. at 191–93.
205 See id. at 192–93.
206 Id. at 194–95.
207 Id. (quoting Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673 (1977)) (alteration in original).
208 See id. at 195.
209 See DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 199–200
(1989).
210 See id. at 201.
211 Rebecca Aviel, Restoring Equipoise to Child Welfare, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 401, 408
(2010).
212 See id. at 406–08, 435.
213 DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 201–02.
214 See, e.g., Andrea Ball & Eric Dexheimer, Dozens of CPS Caseworkers Caught Lying,
Falsifying Documents, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN (Jan. 13, 2015), https://projects.statesman.com/news/cps-missed-signs/wrongdoing.html; Faith Abubey & Lindsey Basye,
800+ Georgia DFCS Workers Disciplined for Violations, 11 ALIVE (Aug. 22, 2019, 4:40 PM),
https://www.11alive.com/article/news/investigations/the-reveal/800-georgia-dfcsworkers-disciplined-for-violations/85-37ce7f6d-7c99-4a22-94db-fd711e53e794;
203
204
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But we do not so often see cases of wrongful removals or coercive
safety plans in the news. As Diane Redleaf, a family defense attorney
and author, writes, “[n]o one wants to take a chance on being on the
wrong side of a child abuse story.”215 Moreover, the horrific abuses we
do see in the news, while awful and heartbreaking, are rare.216 Law
Professor Doriane Lambelet Coleman acknowledges cases of horrific
abuse but notes that, like those children who suffer from extreme abuse
at the hands of their caregivers, children who are the subjects of
intrusive examinations and victims of separation also have “names,
faces, and stories that ought not be hidden from view.”217
Perhaps social worker immunity does make sense, given the
doctrine’s intended goals. But Part IV discusses how this doctrine plays
out in practice to support the conclusion that immunity doctrine must
be reformed in tandem with CPS reforms.
IV. SOCIAL WORKER IMMUNITY IN THE COURTS
Immunity for social workers was discussed by a number of legal
writers in the 1990s and 2000s.218 This is still a relevant and used
defense today, and the following cases will show this. In each of these
cases, defendant social workers asserted qualified immunity, absolute
immunity, or both. Additionally, these cases will provide a look into
social worker activities, the impact on families, the flaws in the system,
and how immunity hinders progress.

Richard Winton, An 8-year-old Boy’s Death Has Social Workers Wondering, ‘Could I Face
Criminal Charges?,’ L.A. TIMES (Feb. 13, 2017), https://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-gabriel-fernandez-social-workers-20170213-story.html
(describing the criminal charges brought against social workers who failed to remove
Gabriel Fernandez before his mother and her boyfriend murdered him).
215 REDLEAF, supra note 51, at 61.
216 As mentioned briefly in Part I, physical abuse cases make up only 10.3 percent of
maltreatment cases. CHILD MALTREATMENT, supra note 9, at 49. Compare that percentage
to the percentage of neglect cases: 61 percent. Id. Also, discussed in Part II, recall that
what is often considered “neglect” is simply poverty.
217 Coleman, supra note 65, at 446.
218 See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 13, at 651; Johns, supra note 153, at 266; Austen L.
Parrish, Avoiding the Mistakes of Terrell R.: The Undoing of the California Tort Claims Act
and the Move to Absolute Governmental Immunity in Foster Care Placement and
Supervision, 15 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 267, 280 (2004); 42 U.S.C. § 1983—Absolute
Immunity—Sixth Circuit Holds That Social Worker Is Not Absolutely Immune From § 1983
Suit, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1647, 1647 (2001); Susan Lynn Abbott, Note, Liability of the State
and its Employees for the Negligent Investigation of Child Abuse Reports, 10 ALA. L. REV.
401, 428 (1993); Eric P. Gifford, Comment, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Social Worker Immunity:
A Cause of Action Denied, 26 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1013, 1013 (1995).
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A. Qualified Immunity
1. Doe v. Woodward
Four-year-old I.B. was attending a Head Start Program when
someone anonymously reported to CPS that there were possible signs
of abuse on her body.219 These signs were “bumps on her face, a nickelsized bruise on her neck, a small red mark on her back, two small cuts
on her stomach, and bruised knees.”220 CPS had investigated I.B. and her
mother around six times before, all based on what the complaint said
were false reports of abuse.221 This time, a CPS social worker went to
I.B.’s preschool without her mother’s consent, took her to the nurse’s
office, removed her clothes, and began taking pictures of her body.222
The worker photographed I.B.’s buttocks, stomach, and back—over
I.B.’s objections.223 Her mother did not hear of the incident until after
CPS determined that the allegations were unsubstantiated, when I.B.
told her that she did not like it when the worker “takes all my clothes
off.”224 When the mother confronted the social worker about the
investigation, the social worker denied it.225 Two months later,
however, she admitted to taking the photographs.226
The Does, I.B. and her mother, sued under § 1983, claiming that the
inspection and photographs violated their Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendment rights.227 The lower court dismissed both claims; it
determined the Does failed to state a claim under the Fourteenth
Amendment and that the social worker was entitled to qualified
immunity on the Fourth Amendment claims.228 The following will
address the claim dismissed on the grounds of qualified immunity.
The court limited its analysis to the second prong of qualified
immunity229—which asks whether the right was clearly established—
using the discretion the Supreme Court granted in Pearson v.

219 Doe v. Woodard, 912 F.3d 1278, 1285 (10th Cir. 2019); Brief of Appellant at 4, Doe
v. Woodard, 912 F.3d 1278 (10th Cir. 2019) (No. 18-1066).
220 Doe, 912 F.3d at 1285.
221 Id. at 1285 n.3 (quoting Amended Complaint ¶ 15, Doe v. Woodard, No. 15-01165,
2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123616 (Sept. 16, 2015)).
222 Id.
223 Id. at 1285–86; Brief of Appellant at 4, Doe v. Woodard, 912 F.3d 1278 (10th Cir.
2019) (No. 18-1066).
224 Doe, 912 F.3d at 1286 (internal citation omitted).
225 Id.
226 Id.
227 Id.
228 Id. at 1288.
229 Id. at 1293.
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Callahan.230 This discretion allowed the court to assess whether the
right was clearly established without addressing the constitutionality of
the conduct.231
The particular issue here, which is not uncommon in CPS immunity
suits,232 was the in-school interview without parental consent or a
warrant.233 Where a search and seizure takes place without a warrant,
it is per se unreasonable.234 The Supreme Court, however, has
recognized certain exceptions to the rule that a warrantless search is
per se unreasonable: consent of the person being searched, if they have
the capacity to consent, or consent by a person authorized to consent on
their behalf; exigent circumstances; or special needs.235 Here, the
question was whether it was clearly established that the special needs
exception did not apply to in-school searches pursuant to child abuse
investigations.236 The Supreme Court recognized the special needs
exception in New Jersey v. T.L.O., where it found school officials did not
need a warrant before searching a student’s purse for drugs because it
would put an undue burden on schools.237 The exception applies if
“special needs[] beyond the normal need for law enforcement” make the
requirements for a warrant and probable cause impracticable.238 If the
special needs exception did apply, the court would hold the social
worker to a lower standard of reasonableness: the search would need
to be justified at its inception and reasonable in its scope given the
circumstances.239
The Does attempted to use four cases to show that the law was
clearly established.240 In Franz v. Lytle, a police officer investigating
child abuse who examined a child’s private areas without a warrant was

See 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009); see also supra Section III.A.
See supra Section III.B.
232 See, e.g., Schulkers v. Kammer, 955 F.3d 520, 530 (6th Cir. 2020); Capp v. Cnty. of
San Diego, 940 F.3d 1046, 1051 (9th Cir. 2019).
233 Doe v. Woodard, 912 F.3d 1278, 1290 (10th Cir. 2019). There is currently a circuit
split as to whether in-school interviews by CPS concerning abuse constitute “special
needs.” See Baxter, supra note 18, at 146. The exception applies “when ‘special needs,
beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause
requirement impracticable.’” Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 829 (2002) (quoting
Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987)).
234 Doe, 912 F.3d at 1290 (quoting Roska ex rel. Roska v. Peterson, 328 F.3d 1230,
1248 (10th Cir. 2003) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967))).
235 Id.
236 See id. at 1291–92.
237 See 469 U.S. 325, 340 (1985).
238 Earls, 536 U.S. at 829 (internal quotations omitted).
239 T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341 (1985) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968)).
240 Doe v. Woodard, 912 F.3d 1278, 1294 (10th Cir. 2019).
230
231
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found to have violated the Fourth Amendment.241 In Dubbs v. Head Start,
Inc., a school’s genital examinations and blood tests, performed
supposedly in order to comply with federal regulations and without
parental consent, were found to be unconstitutional under either
standard.242 The court in Dubbs also asserted that there is no social
worker exception to the Fourth Amendment,243 which would seem to
suggest that the special needs exception would not apply. The third case
the Does cited was Roska v. Peterson, in which the court found the special
needs exception did not apply when a social worker entered a home to
remove a child.244 Lastly, the Does cited Ferguson v. City of Charleston, a
Supreme Court case, which they argued held that excessive
entanglement with law enforcement renders the special needs
exception inapplicable.245
The court distinguished each of these cases, holding that they do
not put a reasonable social worker on notice that undressing and
photographing a child without parental consent violated the Fourth
Amendment.246 Franz did not put a reasonable social worker on notice
because “a police search is not a social worker search.”247 Dubbs did not
put a reasonable social worker on notice because the examinations were
more invasive and not examinations for child abuse.248 Roska did not
put a reasonable social worker on notice because the social worker in
that case did not enter the child’s home.249 Lastly, Ferguson did not put
a reasonable social worker on notice because “Ferguson says nothing
about social workers searching and photographing a child at school
because of suspected child abuse or whether such conduct is
unacceptably entangled with law enforcement to qualify for special
needs analysis.”250
See id. at 1292 (citing Franz v. Lytle, 997 F.2d 784 (10th Cir. 1993)).
See id. (citing Dubbs v. Head Start, Inc., 336 F.3d 1194, 1214–15 (10th Cir. 2003)).
243 See Dubbs v. Head Start, Inc., 336 F.3d 1194, 1205 (10th Cir. 2003) (citing
Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 76 n.9 (2001)).
244 See Doe, 912 F.3d at 1292 (citing Roska v. Peterson 328 F.3d 1230, 1242 (10th Cir.
2003)).
245 See id. at 1294; Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 84 (2001) (holding that
drug tests used in state pregnancy ward were not under the special needs exception
because of coordination with law enforcement).
246 See Doe, 912 F.3d at 1294.
247 Id.
248 See id.
249 See id.
250 Id. at 1294–95. But see Roe v. Texas Dep’t of Protective & Regul. Servs., 299 F.3d
395, 406 (5th Cir. 2002) (holding that the special needs exception did not apply to a
social worker examination for child abuse, emphasizing the overlap of social workers
with law enforcement); see also Baxter, supra note 18, at 135–36 (explaining the
involvement in child abuse investigations).
241
242
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The dissent offered one more case, Safford Unified School District
No. 1 v. Redding, in which the special needs exception did not apply to a
school’s search of a student’s underwear for drugs.251 The dissent
argued that this Supreme Court case, along with Dubbs, put the social
workers on notice that searching intimate areas, in general, required a
warrant, consent, or exigent circumstances.252 The majority, however,
dismissed this argument as defining clearly established law at “a high
degree of generality.”253
Doe v. Woodard illustrates several themes of this Comment—in
both the court’s handling of the case and the facts of the case. First, the
court used the Supreme Court’s narrow definition of clearly established
at the expense of justice for I.B. and her mother. 254 Second, this decision
is practically useless as future precedent because it only examined the
second prong of the qualified immunity analysis—the clearly
established prong. Because of the discretion the Supreme Court granted
in Pearson v. Callahan, the Tenth Circuit did not have to address whether
the conduct was unconstitutional.255 This means that if a similar case is
presented in this circuit in the future, the plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment
right to a warrant and probable cause would still not be clearly
established. Not only did the court fail to decide if this particular search
was unconstitutional, but it also failed to clear the haze surrounding the
application of the special needs exception to child abuse investigations
in the Tenth Circuit. Therefore, social workers there may feel free to
continue on this potentially unconstitutional path with no
consequences.
Turning to the facts of the case, we can see that some of the
characteristics that place families at risk of excessive and unwarranted
state intervention are present here. First, I.B. attends a Head Start
program, a federally funded preschool for low-income families.256 As
discussed in Part II, this means that mandatory reporters like teachers
and social workers are more likely to surveil and report them to CPS.257
Second, the Does are victims of repeated false reports of child abuse.
This report, in particular, was anonymous. False reports, while rare, are
harmful for people like the Does because although they are false, they
251 See Doe v. Woodard, 912 F.3d 1278, 1303–04 (10th Cir. 2019) (Briscoe, J.,
dissenting) (citing Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364 (2009)).
252 See id. at 1302–03.
253 Id. at 1298 (quoting Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1152 (2018)).
254 See id. at 1289.
255 See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009); see also supra Section III.A.
256 See About the Office of Head Start, OFF. OF HEAD START, https://www.acf.hhs.gov/
ohs/about (last visited Feb. 3, 2022).
257 See Fong, supra note 84, at 6.
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still result in investigations. While the six previous CPS investigations
did not result in a § 1983 lawsuit, the absence of such a lawsuit does not
indicate those investigations were any less traumatic for I.B. and her
mother.
2. Schulkers v. Kammer
Holly Schulkers, ready to give birth to her fifth child, checked into
the hospital for labor induction.258 Without notifying her, the hospital
performed a urine drug test that resulted in a “presumptive positive” for
opiates.259 This set the stage for what probably turned out to be the
hardest two months of the Schulkers family’s life. After the birth of her
child, the hospital social worker told Holly about the positive test and
that her newborn’s umbilical cord would be tested for opiates.260 Holly
told the social worker that she had taken some prescription cough
medicine and eaten some poppyseed chips soon before but had never
used opiates.261 Despite this, the social worker did not perform a
confirmatory test on Holly.262 Instead, before receiving the results from
the umbilical cord test, she charted Holly as having a positive drug
screen and a substance use disorder.263 The social worker then put in a
report with Kentucky’s Cabinet for Health and Family Services
(“CHFS”).264 The CHFS intake social worker opened a case to investigate
the abuse and neglect of the five children that Holly cared for because
she thought the children were at “risk of harm.”265 Risk of harm,
according to Kentucky’s standards of practice, is present where the
caretaker exhibits a pattern of conduct that renders the caretaker
“incapable of caring for the immediate and ongoing needs of the child
due to incapacity due to alcohol or other drugs.”266
Three social workers took the case: one was a supervisor, one was
still in training, and we do not know much about the other.267 The three
of them, both in speech and through a “Prevention Plan” (which is the
term this jurisdiction uses for “safety plan”),268 made it clear that Holly
Schulkers v. Kammer, 955 F.3d 520, 526 (6th Cir. 2020).
Id.
260 Id. at 526–27.
261 Id. at 526.
262 Id. at 527.
263 Id.
264 Schulkers v. Kammer, 955 F.3d 520, 527 (6th Cir. 2020).
265 Id.
266 Id.
267 Id. at 528. The third social worker’s last name is not available. Id. at 528 n.3.
268 See KY. DEP’T FOR CMTY. BASED SERVS., STANDARDS OF PRACTICE ONLINE MANUAL: 7.4 CPS
PREVENTION
PLANNING,
https://manuals.sp.chfs.ky.gov/chapter7/42/Pages/74cps
258
259
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could not be with her children unsupervised until the hospital returned
more test results.269 The trainee explained that if she did not follow the
safety plan, CHFS would remove all five of the children.270 The safety
plan itself said that if the preventative services were not effective, the
planned arrangement would be foster care.271 In fact, there was no
arrangement for foster care, and CHFS stamped this language on every
safety plan.272 The day after Holly gave birth, both a second urine test
and the umbilical cord test returned negative results.273 Despite this,
after discharge, the Schulkers remained subject to the safety plan
requiring supervision of Holly at all times.274 Under the belief that
failure to comply with the plan would result in the removal of their
children, the Schulkers followed the orders while requesting that they
be released.275 Holly’s husband even had to take off work in order to
supervise her.276
Soon after Holly’s discharge, the trainee and another worker went
to the four children’s schools to interview them without parental
consent or knowledge—or a warrant.277 They took the children into a
room alone with them and shut the door.278 The children went home
“terrified” they would be taken away from their parents.279
For the next two months, the Schulkers were subject to the plan,
despite further negative tests, requests from the family and their
counsel to be released, and direction to the supervisor from her superior
to release them.280
The Schulkers sued the social workers under § 1983 for violations
of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. They claimed that the inschool interviews were seizures violating the Fourth Amendment and
that the imposition of the Prevention Plan without procedural
protections or suspicion of abuse or neglect violated their due process

preventionplanning.aspx (last visited Feb. 6, 2022). See supra Part II for information on
safety plans.
269 See Schulkers, 955 F.3d at 528.
270 Id.
271 Id.
272 Id. at 528–29.
273 Id. at 529.
274 Id. at 530.
275 Schulkers v. Kammer, 955 F.3d 520, 529 (6th Cir. 2020).
276 Id. at 530.
277 Id.
278 Id.
279 Id.
280 Id. at 531.
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rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.281 The district court denied
qualified immunity to the social workers, and they appealed.282
The Sixth Circuit first considered the Fourth Amendment claims
and ultimately determined there was not a clearly established right
violated in the in-school interviewing of the children.283 The court
discussed Supreme Court precedent and its own precedent; it noted that
the Supreme Court has never held that in-school interviews for child
abuse investigations violated the Fourth Amendment.284
The court then turned to its own precedent. In 2015, the Sixth
Circuit decided Barber v. Miller,285 which was factually similar to
Schulkers. There, the court, in determining whether the social worker
investigating abuse was entitled to qualified immunity, found that their
warrantless in-school interview did not violate a clearly established
right.286 In other words, there was no prior precedent that deemed the
social worker’s conduct unconstitutional. Thus, the court in Barber
elected not to consider the second prong—whether it was
constitutional287—and granted qualified immunity to the social
worker.288 By doing so, it doomed itself to the same outcome in future
cases—including the Schulkers case.289 After the Barber decision, the
court could not find a clearly established right against warrantless inschool interviews because Barber did not clearly establish it. Therefore,
the court in Schulkers found the social workers were entitled to qualified
immunity.290 But the court in Schulkers took the analysis a step further
by considering the constitutionality prong even after deciding the right
was clearly established.291
The Sixth Circuit decided that the social workers’ warrantless inschool interviews pursuant to child abuse investigations were
Schulkers v. Kammer, 955 F.3d 520, 531 (6th Cir. 2020).
Id. at 532.
283 Id. at 533.
284 Id. at 534; see also Camreta v. Greene, 563 U.S. 692, 697–98 (2011) (refusing to
decide on the Ninth Circuit’s determination that warrantless seizure and interrogation
of a child in school violated Fourth Amendment due to the claim later becoming moot).
The Ninth Circuit then vacated the corresponding portion of its opinion. Greene v.
Camreta, 661 F.3d 1201, 1201 (9th Cir. 2011).
285 Barber v. Miller, 809 F.3d 840 (6th Cir. 2015).
286 Id. at 845.
287 Id.
288 Id. at 847.
289 Schulkers v. Kammer, 955 F.3d 520, 535 (6th Cir. 2020).
290 See id. at 535–36.
291 Id. at 536 (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 224 (2009)) (“[W]e decide
to reach [the constitutionality] question now in order to ‘promote[] the development of
constitutional precedent.’”). It is unclear why the Barber court did not also follow the
Supreme Court’s guidance.
281
282
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unconstitutional.292 Following the typical procedure for determining
Fourth Amendment search and seizure violations, it held that the
children would not have felt free to leave.293 In determining
reasonableness, the Sixth Circuit, like the Tenth Circuit in Doe,
considered the special needs exception.294 Here, however, the court did
not decide what standard of reasonableness would apply because the
social workers’ conduct failed under either test.295
The court next considered the claims for Fourteenth Amendment
substantive and procedural due process violations. The court found that
the Prevention Plan requiring Holly’s supervision violated Holly’s
Fourteenth Amendment right to family integrity because there was no
suspicion of abuse.296 It stressed that, while the children were never
removed, the plan interfered with the “parent-child relation.”297
Therefore, the defendants were on notice that the plan would violate a
clearly established constitutional right. As for the procedural due
process claim, the court recognized that the Schulkers’ signing of the
safety plan was based solely on the threats of removal made by the
social workers and indicated on the face of the document; thus, their
signing of the plan did not relieve the defendants from affording the
Schulkers procedural protection before interfering with their
Fourteenth Amendment right.298
While not relevant to the qualified immunity analysis, it is worth
pointing out that the Schulkers’ story is one of many like it299—although
not all of those stories are heard. Diane Redleaf notes that safety plans
of this type often violate procedural due process because they offer
families no opportunity to object and have a neutral decision-maker
decide.300 Like the Schulkers, these families would not dare to question
CPS workers or refuse to cooperate at the risk of CPS taking their
children away.301

Id.
Id. at 536–37.
294 Id. at 537.
295 Schulkers v. Kammer, 955 F.3d 520, 538 (6th Cir. 2020).
296 Id. at 542 (citing Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 68–69 (2000)).
297 Id. (quoting Kottmyer v. Maas, 436 F.3d 684, 689 (6th Cir. 2006)).
298 Id. at 543.
299 See, e.g., Gupta-Kagan, supra note 44; REDLEAF, supra note 51, at 2; Diane Redleaf,
After the Hotline Call, ATLANTIC (Jan. 27, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/01/problem-child-protective-services/580771/.
300 See REDLEAF, supra note 51, at 42.
301 See id. at 2 (“Like 99.9 percent of parents faced with a demand for a safety plan,
[this mother and father] would do anything to keep their children safe from removal by
CPS. They cooperated fully.”).
292
293

SCHNEIDER (DO NOT DELETE)

2022]

4/7/22 4:22 PM

COMMENT

1243

Unfortunately, cooperating tends to be difficult for the families. In
this case, only the mother had to be supervised when with the
children.302 But if the plan requires that neither parent be alone with
the children, the burden falls on extended family—most often
grandparents.303
Turning to the qualified immunity analysis, the court took a step
that the Doe court was unwilling to. In Schulkers, the court, though
finding that the law surrounding warrantless in-school interviews was
not clearly established,304 decided to address the constitutionality of the
in-school interviews in this case “to ‘promote[] the development of
constitutional precedent.’”305 It acknowledges that it did not have to306
and in fact, chose not to in the previous case discussing that issue.307 But
this is one way for lower courts to take qualified immunity reform
matters into their own hands.308
In both Schulkers and Doe, we are provided small but meaningful
glimpses into the minds of the children. In Doe, the court’s rendition of
the facts tells us that I.B. did not like it when the social worker took all
her clothes off.309 In Schulkers, the court tells us that the children were
“terrified.”310 Both of these facts reiterate the concern that mere
investigations are traumatic for children and families.311
3. Capp v. County of San Diego
The facts of this case are relatively simple. Jonathan Capp shared
custody of his two children with their mother.312 CPS received a call that
Jonathan was neglecting and emotionally abusing the children.313 The
social worker asked to speak with Jonathan.314 At this meeting, he first
learned of the in-school interviews that CPS had conducted with his

Schulkers v. Kammer, 955 F.3d 520, 530 (6th Cir. 2020).
See REDLEAF, supra note 51, at 23 (telling how a couple, whose safety plan required
that neither of them be alone with their children, had one of their mothers take care of
the children).
304 Schulkers, 955 F.3d at 535.
305 Id. at 536 (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009)) (alteration in
original).
306 Id. at 536.
307 See Barber v. Miller, 809 F.3d 840, 845 (6th Cir. 2015).
308 See Schwartz, supra note 140, at 1836.
309 Doe v. Woodard, 912 F.3d 1278, 1286 (10th Cir. 2019).
310 Schulkers v. Kammer, 955 F.3d 520, 530 (6th Cir. 2020).
311 See Coleman, supra note 65, at 418.
312 Capp v. Cnty. of San Diego, 940 F.3d 1046, 1050 (9th Cir. 2019).
313 Id. at 1051.
314 Id.
302
303
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children.315 When he asked the social worker to explain the allegations
against him, she refused then left.316 Jonathan, a lawyer, sent a strongly
worded letter to CPS, calling the interview “Kafkaesque” and the
allegations “bogus and extremely offensive,” and threatening to sue.317
Not long after, he learned that the CPS worker had instructed his ex-wife
to file in court to take custody from him.318
Jonathan and his children brought suit under § 1983 for violations
of their First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments rights.319 The court
found that the instruction that Jonathan’s children should not see him
anymore was retaliatory and, therefore, violated the First
Amendment.320 While not finding a case with similar circumstances, the
court concluded that “[a] reasonable official would have known that
taking the serious step of threatening to terminate a parent’s custody of
his children, when the official would not have taken this step absent her
retaliatory intent, violates the First Amendment.”321
The Fourth Amendment claim, like in Doe and Schulkers, was based
on the in-school interviews of the children.322 The court ultimately
concluded that Jonathan did not provide enough information to allege a
Fourth Amendment violation.323 But the court also articulated that even
if it did, the law was not clearly established in that area, so the court
would be “bound” to grant the social worker qualified immunity.324 The
right was not clearly established because—while the Ninth Circuit did
decide in Greene v. Camreta that a social worker’s seizure and interview
of a child without a warrant, exigent circumstances, or parental consent
was unconstitutional325—the Supreme Court vacated that ruling after
finding recent facts rendered it moot.326 The court in Capp was then
bound to find that the defendants had qualified immunity and said
nothing more about the constitutionality of the interviews.327
This case has similarities to the cases previously discussed in this
Comment. Like both Doe and Schulkers, Capp involves a school
315
316
317
318
319
320
321
322
323
324
325
326
327

Id.
Id.
Id. (emphasis in original).
Capp v. Cnty. of San Diego, 940 F.3d 1046, 1051 (9th Cir. 2019).
Id. at 1052.
Id. at 1058.
Id. at 1059.
Id.
Id.
Capp v. Cnty. of San Diego, 940 F.3d 1046, 1059 (9th Cir. 2019).
Id. at 1059–60 (citing Greene v. Camreta, 588 F.3d 1011, 1030 (9th Cir. 2009)).
See Camreta v. Greene, 563 U.S. 692, 694–95 (2011).
Capp, 940 F.3d at 1060.
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interview without parental consent. As in Doe, Capp leaves the
constitutionality question open. As in Schulkers, the court in Capp seems
to use a more general definition of clearly established than Doe. One
important difference, however, is that Jonathan Capp is a very different
plaintiff from either the Does or the Schulkers. He is a white, male,
highly educated lawyer.328 He had no problem questioning the social
worker, and he had no problem writing a letter threatening to sue.329 It
is safe to infer that he knew his rights. So many parents, like the
Schulkers, however, dare not question CPS.
B. Absolute Immunity
1. Turner v. Lowen
After her three-month-old son’s leg began to swell, Keshia Turner
took him to the hospital.330 X-rays and a nurse’s examination revealed
that her son (referred to as RBT) had “thirty-three fractures in his ribs,
legs, and shoulder blade[s].”331 The nurse instructed Keshia and her
husband Roy to go to their local Sheriff’s office, where they were
assigned a CPS social worker.332 Rather than keeping RBT in the local
children’s hospital where he was born, the social worker insisted that
he be transferred to another hospital two-and-a-half hours away.333
When Keshia and Roy objected, the social worker threatened to have
RBT removed.334 The doctor at the new hospital, a child abuse specialist
who was also a defendant in this case, failed to complete a physical
examination of RBT and instead relied on his medical records,
interviews with the parents, and what information the social worker
gave her.335 Even after considering that the fractures could be the result
of brittle bones disease, which can develop in premature infants like
RBT, she concluded that RBT was physically abused and needed
protection “from further harm.”336 The social worker filed an ex parte
petition with the juvenile court for immediate removal of RBT, which

328 See Jonathan C. Capp, Esq., L. OFFS. OF JONATHAN C. CAPP, http://persinjuryattorney.com/attorney-profile/jonathan-c-capp-esq/ (last visited Nov. 11, 2020).
329 See Capp, 940 F.3d at 1051.
330 Turner v. Lowen, No. 19-6235, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 23446, at *2 (6th Cir. July 24,
2020).
331 Id. at *2, *4–5.
332 Id. at *2–3.
333 Id. at *3.
334 Id.
335 See id. at *3–4.
336 Turner v. Lowen, No. 19-6235, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 23446, at *4–5 (6th Cir. July
24, 2020).
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the court granted.337 The Turners requested further testing for brittle
bones disease.338 Their new social worker informed them that CPS
would do no further testing, then substantiated the case, indicating that
Keshia had abused her son.339 Time passed, and Keshia had another son,
who CPS also removed via a granted ex parte petition for emergency
removal.340 After this tragedy, Keshia and Roy sought the opinions of
two different experts, who both concluded that RBT suffered from
brittle bones disease and that the disease was the cause of his injuries.341
The social worker took no action after learning of either expert’s
determination.342 Two years later, after a Tennessee circuit court
determined that the injuries were the result of disease and not abuse,
the Turners finally got their children back.343 RBT was around three
years old.
The sons brought suit against the doctor and the social workers
under § 1983, claiming violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments.344 They alleged that the social workers failed to conduct
an appropriate investigation and withheld exculpatory evidence from
the court, leading to a seizure without probable cause.345 The district
court dismissed the case after granting absolute immunity to the social
workers.346
In affirming, the Sixth Circuit explained that, as discussed, “[t]he
scope of immunity enjoyed by social workers is remarkably broad.”347
As long as the social worker is acting as a legal advocate, the court can
grant absolute immunity—even for “knowing and intentional
misrepresentations.”348 Here, the brothers alleged that the first worker
intentionally omitted exculpatory evidence from the petition for
removal and that, once CPS removed them, the second social worker
failed to provide the court with the omitted exculpatory information and
to investigate RBT’s injuries adequately.349 For the first social worker,
Id. at *5.
Id.
339 Id.
340 Id. at *6.
341 Id. at *6–7.
342 Turner v. Lowen, No. 19-6235, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 23446, at *6–7 (6th Cir. July
24, 2020).
343 Id. at *7.
344 Id.
345 Id. at *7–8.
346 Id. at *8.
347 Id. at *9.
348 Turner v. Lowen, No. 19-6235, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 23446, at *9 (6th Cir. July 24,
2020) (citing Barber v. Miller, 809 F.3d 840, 844 (6th Cir. 2015)).
349 Id. at *10–11.
337
338
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the court determined that the petition and decision to rely on the
doctor’s assessment were associated enough with the judicial process
to warrant quasi-judicial immunity.350 For the second social worker, the
court likewise determined that when social workers act in an advisory
role in recommending to the court whether a child should return home,
that role is also “intimately related to the judicial phase of the child
custody proceedings.”351
The family was therefore left without recourse. If the decision to
withhold information in a petition to remove is covered by absolute
immunity, and the decision to recommend to the court that the child not
return home is covered by absolute immunity, then how would this
family be able to obtain justice and redress for the wrongs they
suffered? They took RBT out of his parents’ care for three years; his
younger brother just under two. RBT had a metabolic bone disease the
entire time. CPS’s intervention turned what was already a nightmare
into an even worse nightmare.
The story that unfolds in Turner v. Lowen is unfortunately
common.352 The parent, noticing an injury, rightfully brings the child to
the hospital or doctor’s office.353 The personnel there, being mandatory
reporters and likely thinking it is better to err on the side of caution,
notify CPS.354 CPS is then involved in that family, often, as in Turner,
making a bad situation worse.355 It is here that we see the importance
of believing families.
The stories in these cases, as the statistics and literature in Parts I
and II explain, happen—whether the families sue or not. But holding
social workers accountable when families bring suit against them helps
the whole system by setting an example and encouraging the
development of both constitutional law and CPS policies.

Id. at *11.
Id. (quoting Rippy ex rel. Rippy v. Hattaway, 270 F.3d 416, 422–23 (6th Cir. 2001)).
352 See LaQuana Chappelle, ‘They Will Not Win,’ RISE (Jan. 18, 2017),
https://www.risemagazine.org/2017/01/they-will-not-win/ (telling the story of a
mother whose children were removed after she took her infant to the hospital for a head
injury she did not know the cause of); Editorial, Pediatrician Group Wrong to Blame
Reporting on Child Abuse, HOUS. CHRON. (Jan. 23, 2020), https://
www.houstonchronicle.com/opinion/editorials/article/Pediatrician-group-wrong-toblame-reporting-on-14995477.php; Redleaf, supra note 299.
353 Redleaf, supra note 299.
354 Id.
355 Id.
350
351
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V. CONSIDERATIONS FOR IMMUNITY AND CPS REFORM
Perhaps, given the rationales of immunity, social workers are
perfect candidates: they have terrible work environments, have to make
life or death decisions, experience trauma—the trauma of others as well
as their own—and do so with little training or resources. But this
assertion assumes that immunity fixes things; it does not. This
Comment argues that holding social workers accountable to some
degree for constitutional violations will deter deliberate misconduct
and discourage an “invade the family’s privacy now, think later”
approach. As Rebecca Aviel acknowledged, social worker immunity is
not CPS’s most pressing issue.356 That is why this Comment proposes
reforms for both immunity doctrine and the CPS system that would
make invasions of family integrity less frequent.
A. Both Qualified and Absolute Immunity Need to be Clearer and
Narrower
Scholars point out that qualified immunity has no real basis in
law.357 Nor does it accomplish, at least for law enforcement, its stated
goals.358 But there should be a stronger pushback for abolishing
qualified and absolute immunity for social workers. As already
discussed, social workers are overworked, underpaid, and deal with a
lot of stress. They have difficult jobs. Many would argue, rightfully so,
that the system is to blame, not the individual social worker. Yet, as the
cases discussed in this Comment show, this broad grant of immunity
denies justice to traumatized families even for unreasonable conduct.
Should the mother and daughter in Doe be prevented from recovering
damages after the social worker performed such an uncomfortable and
invasive investigation of the child’s body?359 Below are several reforms
that may protect families like the Does.
First, absolute immunity need not be absolute to accomplish its
intended goals. If courts retain immunity for social workers when they
perform acts associated with the judicial process, they must impose
some limits. One option is the denial of immunity where the plaintiff
shows bad faith. For example, California Government Code Section
820.21 denies state civil immunity to social workers who maliciously

See Aviel, supra note 211, at 407.
See Baude, supra note 165, at 47; Schwartz, supra note 140, at 1801; Schweikert,
supra note 165.
358 Schwartz, supra note 140, at 1800 (“[Qualified immunity] almost never shields
government officials from costs and burdens associated with discovery and trial in filed
cases.”).
359 See Section IV.A.1.
356
357
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commit perjury, fabricate evidence, fail to disclose exculpatory
evidence, or obtain testimony under duress, fraud, or undue
influence.360 This statute, while not applicable to § 1983 claims, cabins
public officials’ immunity under California Government Code Section
820.2 for discretionary activities.361 California enacted it in response to
concern surrounding a trial court’s grant of absolute immunity to a
social worker whose acts resulted in a child’s removal.362 Applying
similar constraints for immunity in § 1983 claims would deter conduct
like that in Turner,363 where the workers failed to disclose exculpatory
evidence that would have reunited the family.
As some commentators have pointed out in a prosecutorial context,
applying qualified immunity in lieu of absolute immunity is enough to
protect defendants from frivolous lawsuits, and thus, there is no need
for absolute immunity.364 Courts may also limit qualified immunity by
considering subjective intent, an approach the Court rejected in Harlow
v. Fitzgerald.365 This would allow consideration of good or bad faith
where such evidence is available. While not perfect, it would deter
conduct performed in bad faith and grant victims access to justice. It
also would protect those social workers acting without malice or on a
supervisor’s authority.
At the very least, a broader and more articulate “clearly
established” definition would be appropriate.366 Joanna Schwartz
suggests a “higher level of factual generality” that allows recognition for
“obvious constitutional violations” without reference to another
factually similar case.367 This might have affected the outcome in Doe,
where the court found no clearly established law from a case with
similar facts.368 The dissent argued that the previous cases were
sufficient to put the social worker on notice that her conduct—

CAL. GOV’T CODE § 820.21 (Deering 1996).
See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 820.2 (1963); Williams v. Cnty. of Monterey, No. 19-cv01811-BLF, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 180058, at *14–19 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 17, 2019) (discussing
state law immunity).
362 See Hardwick v. Cnty. of Orange, 844 F.3d 1112, 1119 (9th Cir. 2017).
363 Turner v. Lowen, No. 19-6235, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 23446, at *6, *9–11 (6th Cir.
July 24, 2020).
364 See Margaret Z. Johns, Unsupportable and Unjustified: A Critique of Absolute Prosecutorial Immunity, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 509, 534 (2011); Johns, supra note 186, at 136–
38.
365 See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 816–18 (1982); see also Schwartz, supra
note 140, at 1834 (arguing that, given qualified immunity’s policy goals, “[i]t makes no
sense to ignore evidence of government officials’ subjective intent”).
366 See Schwartz, supra note 140, at 1834.
367 Id.
368 See Doe v. Woodard, 912 F.3d 1278, 1299 (10th Cir. 2019).
360
361
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examining the child’s private areas—was unconstitutional even under
the reasonableness standards of the special needs exception.369
Perhaps, under a broader standard like the one Schwartz suggests, that
argument might have been successful.
Schwartz points out that qualified immunity is useless in the law
enforcement context because departments often indemnify
defendants.370 But perhaps indemnification of social workers by CPS
would be beneficial in certain situations. For instance, it might be
appropriate in cases where the social worker is following CPS policy or
norms or is otherwise acting in good faith.371 This would give social
workers the breathing room that is so crucial to the Supreme Court’s
qualified immunity rationale because they would not be personally
liable. Rather, it would put the burden on CPS. At the same time, parents
and children can have their § 1983 claims go to trial. Their voices would
be heard, their injuries would be redressed, and someone would be held
accountable. Because this allows the removal of qualified immunity,
constitutional law could develop. The court would have to decide if
social workers violated a constitutional right; if they did, it sets a
precedent for courts, social workers, and CPS to follow. This would also
motivate CPS to make changes to the system’s structure or policies to
prevent violations of constitutional rights in the first place.
B. CPS Can Adopt Policies That Are Less Invasive
Abolishing immunity would allow for the development of the law,
setting precedent for courts and examples for social workers. For the
sake of social workers and the families they serve, however, reform
cannot stop there. The root of the infringement on the rights of families
is the system itself.
Before considering changes in the CPS system, it is important to
acknowledge that abolition of the child welfare system may be the only
way to truly solve the problems of family regulation.372 But, as the
Center for the Study of Social Policy explains, that is a slow, piece-bypiece dismantling of the system accompanied by the building of
supports in communities and families that replace CPS and accomplish

Id. at 1302–05 (Briscoe, J., dissenting).
See Schwartz, supra note 140, at 1804–06.
371 See, e.g., Schulkers v. Kammer, 955 F.3d 520, 548 (6th Cir. 2020) (showing that
defendants argue that their conduct was “reasonable and in accordance with their own
policies”).
372 See Sharon M. McDaniel, White Privilege in Child Welfare: What Racism Looks Like,
IMPRINT (June 23, 2020, 11:50 PM), https://imprintnews.org/opinion/white-privilegein-child-welfare-what-racism-looks-like/44662; Roberts, supra note 5.
369
370
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what CPS never could: making families safe, happy, and healthy.373 That
work is outside of the scope of this Comment, but there are reforms that,
in the meantime, CPS departments can implement to improve the
system for those already in it.374
In fighting implicit bias, experts point to exposure to
“countertypical associations.”375 This is exposure to people of different
groups towards whom the implicit bias might be directed.376 Applied to
the child welfare context, this could mean making the workforce more
diverse, from social workers to those in higher positions of authority.
Law Professor Tanya Asim Cooper also points out the need for cultural
competency, which is responding respectfully and effectively to people
of different cultures and backgrounds in a way that recognizes their
values and preserves dignity.377
Along this line, the decision-making process can be standardized
with “culturally relevant guidelines” pertaining to what constitutes
abuse and neglect to minimize error.378 Social workers need to have less
discretion. Many of the issues relating to the constitutional violations
discussed here stem from the difficult decisions they need to make: to
substantiate a case or not; what “services” to provide the family;
whether or not the child is in immediate danger and should be removed;
and whether or not the child can return home. These are decisions that
cause stress for both the worker and the family. They are also exactly
where implicit and explicit biases play a huge part, resulting in the
disproportionate number of people of color and low-income individuals
in the system.379 Providing a more structured and standardized
approach, perhaps through supervisors, will help mitigate these issues.
It should be acknowledged, however, that there are risks in eliminating
discretion completely.
Of course, having a more standardized decision-making process
will not be useful if social workers continue to work in an overwhelmed
environment. Cooper lists lack of sufficient social work staff and heavy
373 See What Does it Mean to Abolish the Child Welfare System as We Know It?, CTR.
STUDY OF SOC. POL’Y (June 29, 2020), https://cssp.org/2020/06/what-does-it-mean-toabolish-the-child-welfare-system-as-we-know-it/.
374 See id.
375 Jerry Kang et al., Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1124, 1169 (2012).
376 See id. at 1170 (encouraging the diversifying of the courtroom, as well as
neighborhoods and friendship circles to fight bias in the legal system).
377 See Cooper, supra note 29, at 269 (quoting CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, U.S. DEP’T
OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., ADDRESSING RACIAL DISPROPORTIONALITY IN CHILD WELFARE 5
(2011)).
378 Id. (quoting CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS.,
ADDRESSING RACIAL DISPROPORTIONALITY IN CHILD WELFARE 8 (2011)).
379 See Sankaran, supra note 12.
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caseloads of workers as two factors contributing to unintended
biases.380
Perhaps to help ease the burden on social workers and the system
itself, CPS could narrow its scope.381 In other words, CPS could be
reserved for well-grounded reports of physical or sexual abuse or
serious forms of neglect (such as refusal of life-saving medical
treatment).382 Reports of neglect and administration of services for
whatever treatment or resources families may need should be delegated
to other departments better equipped to handle them.383 Michael Wald
has suggested a system expanding the Women, Infants, and Children and
Early Head Start Programs to provide needed services to at-risk families
without the stigma of CPS or court involvement or the threat of child
removal.384 Since most reports are for neglect, this would free up social
workers and CPS resources to adequately assess and care for serious
threats to child safety. Better yet, this noncoercive offering of direct
services to families would contribute to the prevention of abuse and
neglect in the first place, as would a child allowance.385 Where there is
less opportunity for the coercion and secrecy of CPS, there is less
opportunity for a violation of constitutional rights.
VI. CONCLUSION
The CPS system’s intrusions into children’s and families’ lives
contradict its intended purpose: to keep children and families safe and
healthy. Acting for the system, but with little control over it, are social
workers. They are put in positions that allow them to violate the
constitutional rights of families. Victims of the CPS system whose rights
have been violated may sue under § 1983, yet qualified and absolute
immunity prevents their cases from going to trial. Families deserve to
have the barrier of immunity removed and their stories heard. Yet CPS
social workers deserve an improved working environment that does not
constantly burden them with the discretion to carry out such violations.

Cooper, supra note 29, at 253.
See Wald, supra note 70, at 53.
382 Id.
383 Id.
384 Id. at 60–63.
385 See Roberts, supra note 5. Indeed, the expanded Child Tax Credit—which was
implemented in response to the COVID-19 pandemic as part of the American Rescue
Plan and which Congress failed to extend past its initial one-year duration—was
estimated to have kept 3.8 million children out of poverty in November 2021. Ben
Casselman, Child Tax Credit’s Extra Help Ends, Just as Covid Surges Anew, N.Y. TIMES (Jan.
2,
2022),
https://www.nytimes.com/2022/01/02/business/economy/child-taxcredit.html.
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This Comment has proposed reforms on both sides of the story: the
CPS system and the immunity doctrine. The system must take more
affirmative action in addressing its racism and classism—that of the
system as a whole and its individual workers—by diversifying and
attacking implicit biases. Additionally, this Comment has proposed
narrowing the scope of CPS to lighten the burden put on individual
social workers and give them less discretion. The immunity doctrine
must change as well. This Comment has suggested denying absolute
immunity where bad faith is shown and similarly requiring
consideration of subjective intent in qualified immunity analysis.
Additionally, a broader and more precise definition of “clearly
established” would be more efficient and allow more families to recover
for violations.
With these reforms, perhaps we can take a step toward a society in
which families are safer, happier, and healthier.

